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| TEL AVIV, Israel — It was 3 a.m. on Oct. 7, and Ronen Bar, head of Israel’s domestic security service, still could not determine if what he was seeing was just another Hamas military exercise. |
| 以色列特拉维夫——10月7日凌晨3点，以色列国内安全部门负责人罗南·巴尔仍然无法确定自己所看到的是否只是哈马斯的又一次军事演习。 |
| At the headquarters of his service, Shin Bet, officials had spent hours monitoring Hamas activity in the Gaza Strip, which was unusually active for the middle of the night. Israeli intelligence and national security officials, who had convinced themselves that Hamas had no interest in going to war, initially assumed it was just a nighttime exercise. |
| 在他所在的国内安全局的总部，官员们花了几个小时监视哈马斯在加沙地带的活动，这些活动在半夜异常活跃。以色列的情报和国家安全官员坚信哈马斯无意发动战争，他们最初认为这只是一次夜间演习。 |
| Their judgment that night might have been different had they been listening to traffic on the hand-held radios of Hamas militants. But Unit 8200, Israel’s signals intelligence agency, had stopped eavesdropping on those networks a year earlier because they saw it as a waste of effort. |
| 如果那天晚上他们监听到哈马斯武装分子的手持无线电通讯，他们的判断可能会有所不同。但以色列信号情报机构8200部队早在一年前就停止了对这些网络的窃听，因为他们认为这是浪费精力。 |
| As time passed that night, Bar thought that Hamas might attempt a small-scale assault. He discussed his concerns with Israel’s top generals and ordered the “Tequila” team — a group of elite counterterrorism forces — to deploy to Israel’s southern border. |
| 那天晚上，随着时间的流逝，巴尔认为哈马斯可能会发动一次小规模袭击。他与以色列高级将领讨论了自己的担忧，并命令“龙舌兰”小组——精英反恐部队——部署到以色列南部边境。 |
| Until nearly the start of the attack, nobody believed the situation was serious enough to wake up Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to three Israeli defense officials. |
| 据三名以色列国防官员说，袭击即将开始之前，没有人认为局势严重到需要把内塔尼亚胡总理叫醒。 |
| Within hours, the Tequila troops were embroiled in a battle with thousands of Hamas gunmen who penetrated Israel’s vaunted border fence, sped in trucks and on motorbikes into southern Israel and attacked villages and military bases. |
| 几小时内，龙舌兰部队就卷入了与数千名哈马斯武装分子的战斗，这些武装分子穿过以色列引以为豪的边界围栏，开着卡车和摩托车飞速进入以色列南部，袭击村庄和军事基地。 |
| The most powerful military force in the Middle East had not only completely underestimated the magnitude of the attack, it had totally failed in its intelligence-gathering efforts, mostly due to hubris and the mistaken assumption that Hamas was a threat contained. |
| 以色列这个中东地区最强大的军事力量不仅完全低估了袭击的规模，而且情报收集工作也完全失败，这主要是由于傲慢和错误地认为哈马斯的威胁已经受到遏制。 |
| Despite Israel’s sophisticated technological prowess in espionage, Hamas gunmen had undergone extensive training for the assault, virtually undetected for at least a year. The fighters, who were divided into different units with specific goals, had meticulous information on Israel’s military bases and the layout of kibbutzim. |
| 尽管以色列在间谍活动方面拥有先进的技术实力，但哈马斯武装分子为这次袭击接受了大量训练，实际上至少有一年时间没有被发现。这些战士被分成不同的部队，各自有特定的目标，他们对以色列的军事基地和基布兹的布局拥有缜密的情报。 |
| The country’s once-invincible sense of security was shattered. |
| 以色列曾经坚不可摧的安全感被粉碎了。 |
| More than 1,400 people were killed, including many women, children and old people who were murdered systematically and brutally. Hundreds are held hostage or are missing. Israel has responded with a ferocious bombardment campaign on Gaza, killing more than 8,000 Palestinians and wounding thousands more, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The Israeli military on Sunday signaled a heavier assault on Gaza, saying it had expanded its ground incursion overnight. |
| 1400多人被杀，其中包括许多女性、儿童和老人，他们被有计划地残忍杀害。数以百计人被扣为人质或失踪。据哈马斯管理的卫生部称，以色列对加沙进行了猛烈的轰炸，造成8000多名巴勒斯坦人死亡，数千人受伤。以色列军方周日表示，将对加沙发动更猛烈的袭击，并称已在夜间扩大了地面进攻。 |
| Israeli officials have promised a full investigation into what went wrong. |
| 以色列官员承诺对导致袭击的失误进行全面调查。 |
| Even before that inquiry, it is clear the attacks were possible because of a cascade of failures over recent years — not hours, days or weeks. A New York Times examination, based on dozens of interviews with Israeli, Arab, European and U.S. officials, as well as a review of Israeli government documents and evidence collected since the Oct. 7 raid, shows that: |
| 即使未经调查，也可以明显看出，袭击之所以可能发生，是由于近年来一连串的失误，而不是几小时、几天或几周的失误。根据对以色列、阿拉伯、欧洲和美国官员的数十次采访，以及对10月7日突袭行动以来收集的以色列政府文件和证据的查阅，《纽约时报》的调查显示： |
| — Israeli security officials spent months trying to warn Netanyahu that the political turmoil caused by his domestic policies was weakening the country’s security and emboldening Israel’s enemies. Netanyahu continued to push those policies. On one day in July, he even refused to meet a senior general who came to deliver a threat warning based on classified intelligence, according to Israeli officials. |
| ——以色列安全官员花了数月时间，试图警告内塔尼亚胡，他的国内政策引发的政治动荡正在削弱该国的安全，给以色列的敌人壮胆。而内塔尼亚胡继续推行这些政策。据以色列官员称，7月的一天，他甚至拒绝会见一名前来根据机密情报发出威胁警告的高级将领。 |
| — Israeli officials misjudged the threat posed by Hamas for years and, more critically, in the run-up to the attack. The official assessment of Israeli military intelligence and the National Security Council since May 2021 was that Hamas had no interest in launching an attack from Gaza that might invite a devastating response from Israel, according to five people familiar with the assessments who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive details. Instead, Israeli intelligence assessed that Hamas was trying to foment violence against Israelis in the West Bank, which is controlled by its rival, the Palestinian Authority. |
| ——以色列官员多年来对哈马斯构成的威胁做出错误的判断，更关键的是，在袭击的准备阶段。据五名了解内情的人士透露，自2021年5月以来，以色列军事情报部门和国家安全委员会的官方评估是，哈马斯无意从加沙发动可能招致以色列毁灭性回应的袭击。由于讨论敏感细节，这五名人士要求匿名。相反，以色列情报机构评估称，哈马斯试图煽动针对约旦河西岸以色列人的暴力，而西岸由哈马斯的对手巴勒斯坦权力机构控制。 |
| — The belief by Netanyahu and top Israeli security officials that Iran and Hezbollah, its most powerful proxy force, presented the gravest threat to Israel diverted attention and resources away from countering Hamas. In late September, senior Israeli officials told the Times they were concerned that Israel might be attacked in the coming weeks or months on several fronts by Iran-backed militia groups, but made no mention of Hamas initiating a war with Israel from the Gaza Strip. |
| ——内塔尼亚胡和以色列高级安全官员认为，伊朗及其最强大的代理力量真主党对以色列构成了最严重的威胁，这种看法转移了人们对打击哈马斯的注意力和资源。9月下旬，以色列高级官员告诉《纽约时报》，他们担心未来几周或几个月，以色列可能会受到伊朗支持的民兵组织在几条战线上的袭击，但没有提到哈马斯会从加沙地带发动与以色列的战争。 |
| — U.S. spy agencies in recent years had largely stopped collecting intelligence on Hamas and its plans, believing the group was a regional threat that Israel was managing. |
| ——近年来，美国情报机构基本上已经停止收集有关哈马斯及其计划的情报，认为该组织是地区威胁，已经在以色列掌握中。 |
| Overall, arrogance among Israeli political and security officials convinced them that the country’s military and technological superiority to Hamas would keep the terrorist group in check. |
| 总体而言，以色列政治和安全官员的傲慢态度使他们相信，该国相对于哈马斯的军事和技术优势将使这个恐怖组织得到遏制。 |
| Many senior officials have accepted responsibility, but Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m. Sunday in Israel, after his office was asked for comment on this article, he posted a message on X, formerly Twitter, that repeated remarks he made to the Times and blamed the military and intelligence services for failing to provide him with any warning on Hamas. |
| 许多高级官员已经承担了责任，但内塔尼亚胡还没有。在向他的办公室发出就本文置评的请求后，他于以色列时间周日凌晨1点在X（前Twitter）上发布了一条消息，重复了他对《纽约时报》说过的话，并指责军方和情报部门没有向他提供任何有关哈马斯的警告。 |
| “Under no circumstances and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of war intentions on the part of Hamas,” the post read in Hebrew. “On the contrary, the assessment of the entire security echelon, including the head of military intelligence and the head of Shin Bet, was that Hamas was deterred and was seeking an arrangement.” |
| “内塔尼亚胡总理自始至终在任何情况下都没有收到关于哈马斯战争意图的提醒，”这则用希伯来语写的推文说。“相反，包括军事情报部门和国家安全局负责人在内的整个安全机构的评估，结果都是哈马斯已得到遏制，正在寻求达成协议。” |
| In the resulting furor, Benny Gantz, a member of his war Cabinet, publicly rebuked Netanyahu, saying that “leadership means displaying responsibility,” and urged the prime minister to retract the post. It was later deleted, and Netanyahu apologized in a new one. |
| 此言论引发轩然大波，战时内阁成员本尼·甘茨公开指责内塔尼亚胡，称“领袖意味着担责”，并敦促内塔尼亚胡收回这番言论。该文后被删除，内塔尼亚胡又发了一篇致歉。 |
| Ignored Warnings |
| 被忽视的警告 |
| On July 24, two senior Israeli generals arrived at the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, to deliver urgent warnings to Israeli lawmakers, according to three Israeli defense officials. |
| 据三名以色列国防官员表示，两名以方高级将领曾于7月24日前往国会向议员发出紧急警告。 |
| The Knesset was scheduled that day to give final approval to one of Netanyahu’s attempts to curb the power of Israel’s judiciary — an effort that had convulsed Israeli society, ignited massive street protests and led to large-scale resignations from the military reserves. |
| 国会当天要对内塔尼亚胡限制司法机构权力的提案进行最终表决，该法案引发了以色列社会的动荡，点燃了大规模的街头抗议，并导致大量军队预备役人员辞职。 |
| A growing portion of the air force’s operational pilots was threatening to refuse to report to duty if the legislation passed. |
| 越来越多的空军作战飞行员威胁称，该法案若是得到通过，他们将拒绝到岗。 |
| In the briefcase of one of the generals, Aharon Haliva, head of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Military Intelligence Directorate, were highly classified documents detailing a judgment by intelligence officials that the political turmoil was emboldening Israel’s enemies. One document stated that the leaders of what Israeli officials call the “axis of resistance” — Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad — believed this was a moment of Israeli weakness and a time to strike. |
| 其中一位将领——以色列国防军军事情报局局长亚伦·哈利瓦——在公文包里装着高度机密文件，详细陈述了情报官员的判断，即政治动荡正在令以色列的敌人蠢蠢欲动。一份文件称所谓的反以色列“抵抗轴心”——伊朗、叙利亚、哈马斯、真主党和巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战运动——的领导人都认为，趁以色列弱点暴露之时，他们应当予以打击。 |
| Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, according to one of the documents, said it was necessary to prepare for a major war. |
| 其中一份文件显示，真主党领导人哈桑·纳斯鲁拉说有必要为一场大战做好准备。 |
| Haliva was ready to tell the coalition leaders that the political turmoil was creating an opportunity for Israel’s enemies to attack, particularly if there were more resignations in the military. Only two members of the Knesset came to hear his briefing. |
| 哈利瓦打算告诉联合政府领导人，政治动荡正在为以色列的敌人制造发动袭击的机会，特别是在越来越多的军方人员辞职的情况下。只有两名国会成员前去听取了他的简报。 |
| The legislation passed overwhelmingly. |
| 内塔尼亚胡的法案以压倒性多数获得了通过。 |
| Separately, Gen. Herzi Halevi, the military’s chief of staff, tried to deliver the same warnings to Netanyahu. The prime minister refused to meet him, the officials said. Netanyahu’s office did not respond to a request for comment about this meeting. |
| 另外，国防军总参谋长赫兹·哈勒维中将也曾试图向内塔尼亚胡发出同样的警告。官员们称，总理拒绝与他会面。关于此次会面，内塔尼亚胡办公室没有回应置评请求。 |
| Israeli officials believed that Hezbollah was leading the planning for a coordinated attack against Israel, but not one that would prompt an all-out war. |
| 以色列官员相信真主党正在牵头筹划一场针对以色列的协同袭击，但那不会演变为全面战争。 |
| The officials’ concerns grew through August and September, and Halevi went public with his concerns. |
| 官员们的担忧在8月和9月不断加剧，哈勒维公开表达了他的担忧。 |
| “We must be more prepared than ever for a multiarena and extensive military conflict,” he said at a military ceremony Sept. 11, just weeks before the attack. |
| 9月11日，就在袭击发生几周前，他一场军队仪式中表示，“我们必须要比以往任何时候都更充分地准备应对涉及多区域的广泛军事冲突。” |
| Netanyahu’s allies went on Israeli television and condemned Halevi for sowing panic. |
| 内塔尼亚胡的盟友纷纷在以色列电视台上批评哈勒维散布恐慌。 |
| In a series of meetings, Shin Bet gave similar warnings to senior Israeli officials as Halevi. Eventually, Bar also went public. |
| 在国内安全局的一系列会议中，其他以色列高级官员也收到了类似的警告。最终，巴尔也选择公开发声。 |
| “From the investigations we are doing, we can say today that the political instability and the growing division are a shot of encouragement to the countries of the axis of evil, the terrorist organizations and the individual threats,” Bar said in a speech. |
| “从我们正在进行的调查来看，我们如今可以断定，政局不稳定和日益加剧的分裂给邪恶轴心、恐怖组织和个体威胁注入了一剂强心针，”巴尔在一次讲话中说道。 |
| The Invincibility of the Wall |
| 坚不可摧的城墙 |
| Israeli officials firmly believed that “The Barrier” — a nearly 40-mile-long reinforced concrete wall above and below ground, completed in 2021 — would hermetically seal off Gaza. There was also a surveillance system at the border based almost exclusively on cameras, sensors and remote-operated “sight-shooter” systems, four senior Israeli military officers told the Times. |
| 以色列官员坚信，“隔离墙”——于2021年竣工、在地面和地下蜿蜒60余公里的钢筋混凝土墙——能够将加沙彻底封锁。四名以军高级官员告诉时报，以色列还在边境布下了一个几乎完全由摄像头、传感器和“瞬时射击”遥控系统的监控网。 |
| Senior Israeli military officials believed that the combination of remote surveillance and machine-gun systems with the formidable wall would make it almost impossible to infiltrate Israel, and thus reduce the need for a large number of soldiers to be stationed at the bases. |
| 以军高级官员认为，巍然耸立的隔离墙再加上远程监控和机枪系统足以让入侵以色列成为不可能任务，从而减少了在基地大量驻军的需要。 |
| But Hamas’ attack exposed the fragility of that technology. The group used explosive drones that damaged the cellular antennas and the remote firing systems that protected the fence between Gaza and Israel. |
| 但哈马斯的袭击说明了这些科技的脆弱。该组织使用的爆破无人机破坏了保卫加以隔离墙的移动通信天线和远程发射系统。 |
| To get around Israel’s powerful surveillance technology, Hamas fighters also appeared to enforce strict discipline among the group’s ranks to not discuss its activities on mobile phones. This allowed them to pull off the attack without detection, one European official said. |
| 为了绕过以色列强大的监控技术，哈马斯武装分子内部似乎也有严格的纪律规定，不能用手机讨论行动计划。一名欧洲官员表示，这使得他们能够在不被发现的情况下发动袭击。 |
| The group most likely divided its fighters into smaller cells, each probably only trained for a specific objective. |
| 该组织最可能采用的策略是将武装分子分成更小的作战单位，每个单位可能只针对特定目标进行训练。 |
| In a conversation with military investigators two weeks after the attack, soldiers who survived the assault testified that the Hamas training was so precise that they damaged a row of cameras and communication systems so that “all our screens turned off in almost the exact same second.” The result of all this was a near total blindness on the morning of the attack. |
| 袭击发生两周后，在与军方调查人员谈话时，在袭击中幸存的士兵作证称，哈马斯的训练有极强的目的性，他们甚至能破坏一整排摄像头和通讯系统，导致“我们几乎在同一时间全部黑屏”。一切的一切也致使袭击发生的当天早上，以方对情况几乎一无所知。 |
| After the fighting had stopped, Israeli soldiers found hand-held radios on the dead bodies of some of the Hamas militants — the same radios that Israeli intelligence officials had decided a year ago were no longer worth monitoring. |
| 战斗结束后，以色列士兵在部分哈马斯武装分子的尸体上找到了手持对讲机——那正是以色列情报官员一年前认定不再值得监控的设备。 |
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