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| The sudden and unexpected terror attack by Hamas into Israel has been a crushing blow to a host of assumptions that have defined the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for years. |
| 哈马斯对以色列发动突如其来的恐怖袭击，给多年来界定巴以冲突的一系列假设造成了沉重打击。 |
| Israelis compare the invasion and deaths of some 1,400 Israelis, most of them civilians, to the toll of Sept. 11, 2001, in the United States. And they compare the shocking surprise of the Hamas attack both to Sept. 11 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Israeli forces were unprepared for an Arab attack led by Egypt and Syria that also exploded widely held assumptions. |
| 以色列人将这次入侵和大约1400名以色列人的死亡（其中大部分是平民）与2001年9月11日美国遭受的伤亡相提并论。他们将哈马斯的袭击与9·11事件和1973年的赎罪日战争相提并论，在那场战争中，以色列军队对埃及和叙利亚领导的阿拉伯袭击毫无准备。本次袭击也打破了一些人们普遍持有的假设。 |
| Here are four paradigms now in shatters: |
| 以下是目前已经岌岌可危的四种范式： |
| Hamas could be contained and the conflict managed. |
| 哈马斯可以被遏制，冲突可以得到控制。 |
| For many years, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel carried out a strategy designed to split the Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza. He worked to weaken the power of the Palestinian Authority, the governing body led by President Mahmoud Abbas, by allowing Hamas to retain control over Gaza. |
| 多年来，以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡实施了一项旨在将巴勒斯坦人分裂为约旦河西岸和加沙地带两部分的战略。他通过允许哈马斯保持对加沙的控制，努力削弱巴勒斯坦权力机构（马哈茂德·阿巴斯总统领导的管理机构）的权力。 |
| The theory was that Hamas, supported financially by Qatar, would concentrate more on governing the enclave, and might become more moderate through that responsibility, while also ensuring that it did not hit Israel so hard as to engender a huge military response that would undermine its rule. The conception, as the Israelis like to call it, was to allow Gazans to live better and thus incentivize Hamas to maintain relative calm. |
| 他们的理论是，得到卡塔尔财政支持的哈马斯将更专注于治理这块飞地，并可能通过承担这一责任变得更加温和，同时还能确保它不会对以色列造成太大的打击，以免引发大规模的军事反应，从而破坏其统治。按照以色列人的说法，这种构想是为了让加沙人生活得更好，从而激励哈马斯保持相对平静。 |
| In practice, that meant Israel allowed Qatar to fund the Hamas government, while providing essentially free electricity and enough water, food and medicine for people to get by. Israel allowed a small number of Gazans to work in Israel, but, with Egypt, kept most of the population locked inside what many called “an open air prison.” |
| 实际上，这意味着以色列允许卡塔尔为哈马斯政府提供资金，同时提供基本免费的电力和足够的水、食物和药品供人们生活。以色列允许一小部分加沙人在以色列工作，但与埃及一道，将大多数加沙人关在许多人所说的“露天监狱”里。 |
| “This entire strategy has one goal,” said Noa Shusterman Dvir, who studies the Palestinian arena for MIND Israel, which describes itself as a nonprofit consulting firm for Israeli national security institutions. “Weakening the Palestinian Authority and strengthening Hamas is designed to hinder peace efforts, to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.” |
| “整个战略只有一个目标，”为MIND Israel研究巴勒斯坦问题的诺亚·舒斯特曼·德维尔说。该机构自称是一家为以色列国家安全机构服务的非营利咨询公司。“削弱巴勒斯坦权力机构和加强哈马斯的目的是阻碍和平努力，阻止巴勒斯坦建国。” |
| Now, Ms. Shusterman Dvir said, “the concept of ‘managing the conflict’ is broken.” |
| 舒斯特曼·德维尔说，现在，“‘管理冲突’的概念被打破了。” |
| Israel is invincible and maintains military superiority. |
| 以色列战无不胜，保持着军事优势。 |
| Israel possesses what is widely considered the best and most sophisticated military in the Middle East, with an American commitment to keep it more technologically advanced than any of its adversaries’. With their main concern a potential war with Iran, Israelis were convinced that they had good intelligence on Hamas throughout tiny Gaza and, with American help, good intelligence about Iran and Hezbollah. |
| 以色列拥有被广泛认为是中东地区最精良、最先进的军队，美国承诺让以色列在技术上领先于任何对手。以色列人主要担心的是与伊朗的潜在战争，他们确信自己掌握了关于整个加沙地带哈马斯的情报，而且在美国的帮助下，他们还掌握了关于伊朗和真主党的情报。 |
| But like the United States on Sept. 11, an opponent with far fewer resources carried out an attack that was never imagined and thus achieved major strategic surprise. |
| 但就像9·11事件中的美国一样，一个资源少得多的对手发动了一场意想不到的袭击，从而取得了重大的战略奇袭。 |
| While Hamas’s equipment is relatively low tech, it used drones and its own intelligence to defeat Israel’s supposedly invincible border, which was replete with sophisticated cameras, sensors and automatic guns. Israel’s overconfidence, complacency and overreliance on technology, as well as the fact that Oct. 7 was a Jewish holiday, were all instrumental in its defeat that day. |
| 虽然哈马斯的装备技术含量相对较低，但它利用无人机和自己的情报打败了以色列本应坚不可摧的边境，那里布满了精密的摄像头、传感器和自动枪支。以色列的过度自信、自满和对技术的过度依赖，以及10月7日是犹太节日的事实，都是导致以色列在那天失败的重要原因。 |
| And Hamas’s ability to keep its plans secret, despite the several hundred fighters who must have been informed, was a serious blow to Israeli pride in its human intelligence on the ground in Gaza. |
| 此外，在有数百名武装人员肯定已经知情的情况下，哈马斯仍有对其计划保密的能力，这是对以色列引以为傲的加沙地方人力情报能力的严重打击。 |
| “After the astounding collapse of the Arab armies in 1967, Israel developed a conception that Arabs couldn’t fight, without imagining they might get better,” said Gershom Gorenberg, an Israeli historian. “So Israel was surprised by the 1973 attack,” just as it was surprised on Oct. 7 by Hamas. |
| “在1967年阿拉伯军队令人震惊地崩溃之后，以色列形成了一种观念，认为阿拉伯人不会打仗，不会去设想他们会改进，”以色列历史学家格索姆·戈伦伯格说。“因此，以色列对1973年的袭击感到惊讶，”就像10月7日对哈马斯感到惊讶一样。 |
| “There was the preconception that we could seal off Gaza, that the measures we took would sufficiently prevent weaponry getting in,” he said. “But the problem with a technical fix to a major military problem is that the other side adapts.” |
| “有一种先入为主的观念，认为我们可以封锁加沙，我们采取的措施足以防止武器进入，”他说。“但用技术手段解决重大军事问题的问题在于，另一方会做出调整。” |
| When Hamas was shooting rockets, Israel learned how to shoot most of them down. When Hamas concentrated on building tunnels, Israel developed means of discovering and destroying them, and it assumed the problem was sufficiently solved. “But we didn’t think about Hamas attacking the cameras or using hang gliders,” Mr. Gorenberg said. |
| 当哈马斯发射火箭弹时，以色列学会了如何击落其中的大部分。当哈马斯集中精力建造隧道时，以色列开发了发现和摧毁隧道的方法，并认为问题已经充分解决。“但我们没想过哈马斯会攻击摄像头或使用悬挂式滑翔机，”戈伦伯格说。 |
| With Israeli military credibility suddenly questioned, concerns have emerged about what capacities Iran has provided Hezbollah in southern Lebanon that the Israelis have failed to imagine. |
| 随着以色列的军事信誉突然受到质疑，人们开始担心，伊朗向黎巴嫩南部的真主党提供了哪些以色列人无法想到的能力。 |
| The Arab world is moving on, despite the Palestinians. |
| 阿拉伯世界已经向前看，抛下了巴勒斯坦人 |
| Mr. Netanyahu has won praise for his outreach to the Arab world that shares Israel’s deep concerns about Iran — its nuclear program, its sponsorship of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and its ambitions to be a hegemon in the region. |
| 内塔尼亚胡与阿拉伯世界的沟通赢得了赞誉，后者和以色列一样对伊朗怀着深切的担忧，包括它的核计划、对哈马斯和真主党等恐怖组织的支持，以及在该地区称霸的野心。 |
| With the support and mediation of the United States, Mr. Netanyahu signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, normalizing relations. Morocco and Sudan later signed, too. |
| 在美国的支持和调停下，内塔尼亚胡于2020年与巴林和阿联酋签署了《亚伯拉罕协定》，实现关系正常化。此后摩洛哥和苏丹也签了。 |
| More ambitiously, Israel and the United States have been negotiating with Saudi Arabia, the key Arab country, for normalization with Israel in return for a mutual-defense treaty with Washington and some assistance on civilian nuclear technology. |
| 以色列和美国还有更远大的目标，他们和关键的阿拉伯国家沙特磋商寻求以沙关系正常化，回报是与华盛顿签署共同防御条约，并在民用核技术方面予以协助。 |
| But what the Palestinians would get in return has never been clear. There was an assumption in Israel that these Arab states now recognized Israel as an ineradicable fact in the region and a source of business, technology and trade, and that they no longer regarded the plight of the Palestinians as a major obstacle. |
| 然而巴勒斯坦人可以得到什么，始终不清不楚。以色列国内一厢情愿地认为，这些阿拉伯国家已经承认以色列是该地区一个既成的事实，承认以色列是一个商业、技术和贸易来源，它们已经不再把巴勒斯坦人的困境作为一项主要障碍。 |
| Saudi officials had expressed frustration that Israel seemed unwilling to grant more concessions to the Palestinians, especially as tensions rose in the occupied West Bank over increasing Israeli settlements and the treatment of villagers there. But Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia said in September, “Every day we get closer.” |
| 沙特官员就以色列不愿向巴勒斯坦人做出更多妥协表达了不满，尤其是随着以色列定居点增加和当地村民受到不公待遇，被占领的约旦河西岸局势日趋紧张。但是沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼在9月说，“我们的距离每一天都在拉近。” |
| No longer. With Iran now claiming that Tehran, with its clients Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, has an “axis of resistance” that is the real champion of the Palestinians, those talks have been suspended, and Saudi Arabia is again talking with Iran. |
| 现在不会了。如今伊朗在宣称德黑兰及其代理人哈马斯、真主党、巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织是真正在捍卫巴勒斯坦人的“抵抗轴心”，这些谈判也都已经停止，沙特再次开始与伊朗对话。 |
| While these Sunni states have no love for Hamas, Islamist radicalism or Iran, Arab popular reaction to the deaths of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank will put any further normalization on hold for some time. There has always been a tension between public support for the Palestinian cause, sometimes used by Arab leaders to deflect domestic criticism, and the colder judgment of those leaders that Palestinian Islamist militants supported by Iran, like Hamas, were threats to their own governments, and that better relations with Israel mattered more. |
| 这些逊尼派国家对哈马斯、伊斯兰激进主义或伊朗都没什么好感，但阿拉伯世界民众对加沙和西岸巴勒斯坦人的死难做出的反应导致任何关系正常化的进程都会暂时停止。一方面巴勒斯坦人的事业有公众支持——阿拉伯领导人自己有时也会利用这种支持来转移国内的批评，另一方面是领导人们的冰冷计算——哈马斯这样的巴勒斯坦伊斯兰武装组织有伊朗在支持，是对其政府的威胁，且与以色列改善关系更为重要，两者间始终存在一种此消彼长的紧张关系。 |
| Hamas wanted to force the Palestinian question back on the table, and it has done so with a vengeance, prompting the kind of huge pro-Palestinian demonstrations in Arab cities not seen for a decade. |
| 哈马斯想迫使巴勒斯坦问题重新回到议事日程，他们通过一场复仇行动实现了这个目标，在阿拉伯世界掀起已有十年未见的大规模支持巴勒斯坦示威活动。 |
| “The war has brought the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back to the forefront,” said Nir Boms, a research fellow at Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University who studies regional cooperation. “The last thing the Gulf wants is for Hamas to win. Yet look at their reactions. They do what they do because they are influenced by public opinion.” |
| “战争将以巴冲突重新推到最前沿，”研究地区合作的特拉维夫大学摩西·达扬中心研究员尼尔·卜姆斯说。“海湾地区最不想看到的就是哈马斯获胜。然而看看他们的反应。他们这么做是因为他们要受公共舆论的影响。” |
| America can ignore the Middle East. |
| 美国可以不理会中东 |
| For many years now, the United States has given lip service to its commitment to a two-state solution and a condemnation of Israeli settlement growth in the occupied West Bank. It helped mediate the Abraham Accords under President Donald J. Trump and focused on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, but the Palestinians were considered a side issue. |
| 多年来，美国一直在口头上重复着对两国方案的承诺，谴责以色列在被占领的西岸进行的定居点扩张。美国在唐纳德·J·特朗普总统任内促成了《亚伯拉罕协定》，把注意力放在沙特和海湾地区，巴勒斯坦人被认为只是旁枝末节。 |
| Far more important for Washington has been China and the Indo-Pacific, and for two years now, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the need to marshal NATO against Moscow. |
| 中国和印太地区在华盛顿眼中要重要的多，此外还有过去两年里俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵以及集结北约力量与莫斯科对抗的需求。 |
| But President Biden has thrown himself back into the region with his undiluted support for Israel and his effort to keep faith with Arab countries threatened by Iran and its subsidiaries. And in the aftermath of this war, whenever it comes, the United States will be looked upon as the only power capable of providing a new paradigm for peace. |
| 然而拜登总统重新投身于该地区，对以色列表达了毫无保留的支持，并努力安抚受到伊朗及其附属力量威胁的阿拉伯国家。无论这场战争何时结束，届时美国将被视为唯一有能力提出和平新范式的大国。 |
| “One of those shattered narratives is that America can turn its attention to real issues elsewhere and let go of the Middle East,” Mr. Gorenberg said. “I’m sorry, America, but the Middle East is not done with you. Geopolitical facts cannot be ignored,” he said, noting that Iran, Egypt and Russia have had interests in the Mediterranean for centuries. |
| “一个如今已经彻底破灭的叙事是，美国可以把注意力转移到其它真正重要的问题上去，在中东放手，”戈伦伯格说。“对不起了，美利坚，你在中东的事还没了结。地缘政治事实是不容无视的，”他提到几百年来伊朗、埃及和俄罗斯都对地中海地区一直存在的兴趣。 |
| With its embrace of Israel and deterrence of Iran, “Biden has the legitimacy now to put forth a blueprint for the future,” said Akiva Eldar, an Israeli analyst. “Netanyahu needs the U.S. to lead.” |
| 凭借对以色列的支持和对伊朗的威慑，“拜登具备了推出一份未来蓝图的资格，”以色列分析师阿基瓦·艾尔达说。“内塔尼亚胡需要美国来带头。” |
| In a major speech upon his return to Washington, Mr. Biden said that “American leadership is what holds the world together.” He added: “To put all that at risk if we turn our backs on Ukraine, if we walk away from Israel — it’s just not worth it.” |
| 在回到华盛顿后的一次重要讲话中，拜登说“美国的领导让世界免于分崩离析”。他还说：“如果我们抛弃乌克兰，如果我们不管以色列，这一切都会面临危险——这是不值得的。” |
| Only Washington, which now has unprecedented moral prestige in Israel, is capable of assembling the pieces from this war, said Bernard Avishai, an American-Israeli who has taught at both Dartmouth College and Hebrew University. |
| 如今华盛顿在以色列有着空前的道德威望，只有它可以在这场战争之后将一切缝合起来，在达特茅斯学院和希伯来大学任教的美裔以色列人伯纳德·阿维沙伊说。 |
| “Only the United States can provide some degree of hope,” he said, that a new paradigm will be established “in which Palestinian self-determination will finally be addressed.” American statements on a two-state solution and the settlements “have been seen as platitudes,” he added. “But to do something concrete now, it’s not too late.” |
| “只有美国可以带来这样的希望，”他说，能让一种新的范式建立起来，从而“让巴勒斯坦自决的问题终于得到解决”。美国在两国方案和定居点扩张问题上的声明“被认为是老调重弹”，他说。“但是现在开始做一些切实的事情还不算晚。” |
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