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为何以色列安全部门未能阻止哈马斯袭击
How Israel’s Feared Security Services Failed to Stop Hamas’s Attack

来源:纽约时报    2023-10-11 04:00



        Shortly before attackers from Gaza poured into Israel at dawn on Saturday, Israeli intelligence detected a surge in activity on some of the Gazan militant networks it monitors. Realizing something unusual was happening, they sent an alert to the Israeli soldiers guarding the Gazan border, according to two senior Israeli security officials.        就在上周六黎明时分,来自加沙的袭击者涌入以色列之前不久,以色列情报部门发现其监控的一些加沙武装分子网络的活动有所激增。据两名以色列高级安全官员说,他们意识到有异常情况发生,于是向守卫加沙边境的以色列士兵发出了警报。
        But the warning wasn’t acted upon, either because the soldiers didn’t get it or the soldiers didn’t read it.        但是,由于士兵们没有收到警告,或者士兵们没有读到警告,并没有人就相关警告采取行动。
        Shortly afterward, Hamas, the group that controls Gaza, sent drones to disable some of the Israeli military’s cellular communications stations and surveillance towers along the border, preventing the duty officers from monitoring the area remotely with video cameras. The drones also destroyed remote-controlled machine guns that Israel had installed on its border fortifications, removing a key means of combating a ground attack.        不久之后,控制加沙的哈马斯组织派出无人机,摧毁了以色列军方边境沿线的一些蜂窝通讯站和监视塔,使值班人员无法用摄像机远程监控该地区。无人机还摧毁了以色列安装在边境防御工事上的遥控机枪,使以色列失去了对付地面袭击的关键手段。
        That made it easier for Hamas assailants to approach and blow up parts of the border fence and bulldoze it in several places with surprising ease, allowing thousands of Palestinians to walk through the gaps.        这使得哈马斯袭击者更容易接近并炸毁部分边界围栏,并在几个地方极为轻松地将其推平,从而使数以千计巴勒斯坦人能够穿过这些缝隙。
        These operational failures and weaknesses were among a wide array of logistical and intelligence lapses by the Israeli security services that paved the way for the Gazan incursion into southern Israel, according to four senior Israeli security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity in order to discuss a sensitive matter and their early assessment of what went wrong.        四名以色列高级安全官员表示,这些行动失误和薄弱环节是以色列安全部门在后勤和情报方面的一系列失误之一,为加沙入侵以色列南部铺平了道路。由于是在讨论敏感问题,以及对问题的评估还处于初步阶段,这四名官员要求匿名。
        The brazen infiltration of more than 20 Israeli towns and army bases in that raid was the worst breach of Israel’s defenses in 50 years and shattered the nation’s sense of security. For hours, the strongest military in the Middle East was rendered powerless to fight back against a far weaker enemy, leaving villages defenseless for most of the day against squads of attackers who killed more than 900 Israelis, including soldiers in their underwear; abducted at least 150 people; overran at least four military camps; and spread out across more than 30 square miles of Israeli territory.        在这次袭击中,加沙人肆无忌惮地渗透到以色列20多个城镇和军队基地,这是50年来以色列防线遭到的最严重破坏,以色列人的安全感也随之崩溃。在几个小时内,中东地区最强大的军队无力反击远比他们弱小的敌人,在一天的大部分时间里,各个村庄对成群结队的袭击者毫无还手之力,这些袭击者杀死了900多名以色列人,其中包括穿着内衣的士兵;他们绑架了至少150人;占领至少四个军营;并在以色列领土上推进了多于77平方公里的面积。
        The four officials said the success of the attack, based on their early assessment, was rooted in a slew of security failures by Israel’s intelligence community and military, including:        这四名官员表示,根据他们的初步评估,这次袭击的成功源于以色列情报界和军方的一系列安全失误,包括:
        • Failure by intelligence officers to monitor key communication channels used by Palestinian attackers;        • 情报官员未能监控巴勒斯坦袭击者使用的主要通讯渠道;
        • Overreliance on border surveillance equipment that was easily shut down by attackers, allowing them to raid military bases and slay soldiers in their beds;        • 过度依赖边境监控设备,这些设备很容易被袭击者关闭,从而使他们能够袭击军事基地,杀死还在床上的士兵;
        • Clustering of commanders in a single border base that was overrun in the opening phase of the incursion, preventing communication with the rest of the armed forces;        • 指挥官集中在一个边境基地,而该基地在入侵开始阶段就被攻破,从而阻碍了与其他武装部队的联系;
        • And a willingness to accept at face value assertions by Gazan military leaders, made on private channels that the Palestinians knew were being monitored by Israel, that they were not preparing for battle.        • 愿意接受加沙军事领导人在私人频道上称没有为战斗做准备的说法,但巴勒斯坦人知道这些频道受到以色列的监视。
        “We spend billions and billions on gathering intelligence on Hamas,” said Yoel Guzansky, a former senior official at Israel’s National Security Council. “Then, in a second,” he added, “everything collapsed like dominoes.”        “我们花了数十亿美元收集有关哈马斯的情报,”以色列国家安全委员会前高级官员约埃尔·古赞斯基说。“然后,就在一瞬间,”他还说,“一切都像多米诺骨牌一样崩塌了。”
        The first failure took root months before the attack, as Israeli security chiefs made incorrect assumptions about the extent of the threat that Hamas posed to Israel from Gaza.        第一次失败在袭击发生前几个月就已经开始,当时以色列安全官员对哈马斯从加沙对以色列构成的威胁程度做出了错误的假设。
        Hamas stayed out of two fights in the past year, allowing Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a smaller armed group in Gaza, to take on Israel alone. Last month, Hamas leadership also ended a period of rioting along the border, in an agreement brokered by Qatar, giving the impression that they were not looking for an escalation.        在过去的一年里,哈马斯没有参与两场战斗,这让巴勒斯坦伊斯兰圣战组织(加沙的一个较小的武装组织)单独对抗以色列。上个月,哈马斯领导层还在卡塔尔的斡旋下达成了一项协议,结束了边境一带的一段骚乱,给人的印象是他们不希望事态升级。
        “Hamas is very, very restrained and understands the implications of further defiance,” said Tzachi Hanegbi, Israel’s national security adviser, in a radio interview six days before the assault.        “哈马斯非常、非常克制,它明白进一步挑衅的后果,”以色列国家安全顾问扎奇·哈内比在袭击发生六天前接受电台采访时说。
        When Israeli intelligence officials briefed senior security chiefs last week about the most urgent threats to the country’s defenses, they focused on the dangers posed by Lebanese militants along Israel’s northern border.        上周,当以色列情报官员向高级安全官员通报该国国防面临的最紧迫威胁时,他们把重点放在了黎巴嫩武装分子沿以色列北部边境构成的危险上。
        The challenge posed by Hamas was barely mentioned.        哈马斯的挑战几乎没有被提及。
        Hamas is deterred, the briefers said, according to one of the security officials.        据一名安全官员透露,简报者说,哈马斯被吓住了。
        In calls, Hamas operatives, who talked to each other when tapped by Israeli intelligence agents, also gave the sense that they sought to avoid another war with Israel so soon after a damaging two-week conflict in May 2021, according to two of the Israeli officials. Israeli intelligence, they said, is now looking into whether those calls were real or staged.        两名以色列官员称,以色列情报人员的监听到哈马斯特工的互相交谈,谈话给人的感觉是,在2021年5月发生了一场破坏性的两周冲突后,哈马斯希望尽快避免与以色列爆发另一场战争。以色列官员说,以色列情报部门目前正在调查这些电话是真实的还是故意伪装的。
        The next failure was operational.        下一个失败是操作上的。
        Two of the officials said that the Israeli border surveillance system was almost entirely reliant on cameras, sensors and machine guns that are operated remotely.        其中两名官员表示,以色列的边境监视系统几乎完全依赖远程操作的摄像头、传感器和机枪。
        Israeli commanders had grown overly confident in the system’s impregnability. They thought that the combination of remote surveillance and arms, barriers above ground and a subterranean wall to block Hamas from digging tunnels into Israel made mass infiltration unlikely, reducing the need for significant numbers of soldiers to be physically stationed along border line itself.        以色列指挥官对该系统的坚不可摧变得过于自信。他们认为,远程监视和武器、地面上的屏障,以及阻止哈马斯挖地道进入以色列的地下墙相结合,使得大规模渗透不太可能发生,从而减少了在边界线沿线部署大量士兵的必要性。
        With the system in place, the military started reducing the number of troops there, moving them to other areas of concern, including the West Bank, according to Israel Ziv, a retired major general who commanded ground forces in the south for many years, served as the head of the I.D.F.’s Operations Division from 2003 to 2005, and was recently recruited into the reserves again because of the war.        以色列退役少将伊斯雷尔·齐夫曾在南部指挥地面部队多年,2003 年至 2005 年担任以色列国防军作战部部长,最近因战争再次被招募为后备役。他说,随着该系统的到位,军方开始减少那里的部队数量,将他们转移到其他令人担忧的地区,包括西岸。
        “The thinning of the forces seemed reasonable because of the construction of the fence and the aura they created around it, as if it were invincible, that nothing would be able to pass it,” he said.        他说:“部队的减少似乎是合理的,因为围栏的建造和他们在周围营造的光环,好像它是不可战胜的,没有什么能通过它。”
        But the remote-control system had a vulnerability: It could also be destroyed remotely.        但远程控制系统有一个漏洞:它也可以被远程摧毁。
        Hamas took advantage of that weakness by sending aerial drones to attack the cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the surveillance system, according to the officials and also drone footage circulated by Hamas on Saturday and analyzed by The New York Times.        据这些官员,以及哈马斯在周六传播的无人机视频,哈马斯利用了这一弱点,派出无人机攻击向监控系统发送信号的手机信号塔,《纽约时报》对这段视频进行了分析。
        Without cellular signals, the system was useless. Soldiers stationed in control rooms behind the front lines did not receive alarms that the fence separating Gaza and Israel had been breached, and could not watch video showing them where the Hamas attackers were bulldozing the barricades. In addition, the barrier turned out to be easier to break through than Israeli officials had expected.        在没有蜂窝网络信号的情况下,整个系统就毫无用处了。在加沙和以色列之间的屏障被突破时,驻扎在前线控制室的士兵没有收到警报,也看不到哈马斯人员用推土机破坏屏障的视频画面。此外,以色列官员现在才知道,这道屏障并没有他们以为的那么牢不可破。
        That allowed more than 1,500 Gazan fighters to surge through nearly 30 points along the border, some of them in hang-gliders that flew over the top of the barricades, and reach at least four Israeli military bases without being intercepted.        超过1500名加沙武装人员因此从边境近30个突破口进入,其中一些是利用滑翔翼飞越屏障,他们最终冲到了至少四座以色列军事基地,全程没有遇到阻击。
        Photos shared by one of the Israeli officials showed that scores of Israeli soldiers were then shot as they slept in their dorms. Some were still wearing their underclothes.        其中一位以色列官员分享的照片显示,许多以色列士兵是在宿舍睡觉时被打死的。其中有些还穿着内衣。
        The second operational failure was the clustering of leaders from the army’s Gaza division in a single location along the border. Once the base was overrun, most of the senior officers were killed, injured or taken hostage, according to two of the Israeli officials.        第二个失误是将加沙部队的主官集中在边境上的一个地点。其中两位以色列官员说,基地陷落后,多数高级军官死的死、伤的伤,或者被劫持。
        That situation, combined with the communication problems caused by the drone strikes, prevented a coordinated response. This kept anyone along the border from grasping the full breadth of the assault, including the commanders who rushed from elsewhere in Israel to launch a counterattack.        这一状况再加上无人机打击造成的通讯问题,导致无法做出多方协调的反应。边境上的所有人都无从知晓袭击的整体情况,这包括了那些从以色列其它地方赶来发起反击的指挥官。
        “Understanding what the picture was of the different terrorist attacks was very difficult,” said Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfuss, an Israeli commander who helped lead the counterattack.        “要理解不同的恐怖主义袭击是何种景象,是非常困难的,”参与反攻指挥的以军指挥官丹·戈德法斯准将说。
        At one point on the ground, the general encountered — by chance — a commander from another brigade. There and then, the two men decided on an ad hoc basis which villages their respective units would try to retake.        将军回忆说,他在战场上一度偶遇另一个旅的指挥官。两人当即商定各自的部队分别去负责夺回哪些村庄。
        “We decided just between ourselves,” the general said. “And that’s how we went by, from one village to another.”        “我们是自己商量决定的,”将军说。“就这样一个村子一个村子地过。”
        All of this meant it was hard, especially in the early stages, to communicate the gravity of the situation to the military high command in Tel Aviv.        这一切都意味着很难向特拉维夫的最高指挥层通报情况的严重性,尤其是在初期。
        As a result, no one there sensed the immediate need for a massive, rapid air cover, even as social media emerged with reports of attacks in many communities. It took hours for the Air Force to arrive over much of the area, even though it has bases just minutes away in flying time, according to two of the Israeli officials and survivors of the attacks.        因此,在场的人都没意识到需要即可展开一场大规模的、快速的的空中支援,尽管社交媒体上已经开始出现许多聚居地遇袭的报道。具两名以色列官员和袭击幸存者说,空军在几个小时后才抵达其中的许多区域,尽管他们从基地飞到那里只需要几分钟。
        The fallout has been catastrophic for Israel’s security, as well as potentially damaging to its reputation in the region as a reliable military partner.        由此带来的后果对以色列的安全防卫是一个灾难,可能还会破坏自己作为该地区值得信赖的军事合作伙伴的形象。
        Before Saturday, “Israel was an asset to many countries in the region on security issues,” Mr. Guzansky said. “The image now is that Israel is not an asset.”        上周六的袭击之前,“这个地区的许多国家在安全问题上需要以色列,”古赞斯基说。“现在给人的印象是以色列没什么用处。”
        The Israeli security services do not dispute the scale of their initial failure. But they say that it can only be investigated after the war ends.        以色列安全部门并不否认在最初应对上的严重失败。但他们说,这些问题只能等战后去调查。
        “We’ll finish this,” said Lt. Col. Richard Hecht, a military spokesman, as the army attempted to regain control of the communities on Saturday.        “我们会完成眼下的事,”在周上六以军尝试夺回各社区之时,以色列军方发言人理查德·赫克特说。
        But, he said, “You know that this will be investigated.”        但他说,“你知道是会对这件事进行调查的。”
                
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