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| In his office in New Delhi, Ashwini Vaishnaw, the Indian minister of electronics and information technology, keeps a 12-inch disc of silicon semiconductor on the wall, gleaming like a platinum record beside a portrait of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Its circuits, measured in nanometers and invisible to the human eye, may be the most sophisticated objects ever made. It vies with oil as one of most valuable traded goods on earth. | 在印度电子和信息技术部部长阿什维尼·瓦什瑙位于新德里的办公室里，墙上总理纳伦德拉·莫迪的肖像旁边挂着一张12英寸的硅半导体圆盘，像白金唱片般闪闪发光。它的电路以纳米为单位，肉眼是看不见的，可能是有史以来最精密的物体。它与石油一样，是世界上最具价值的贸易商品之一。 |
| According to India’s government, the microprocessor chips that power all things digital will soon be fully made in India. It’s an ambition as unlikely as it is bold, and speaks volumes about Mr. Modi’s belief that he can propel India into the top tier of advanced technology manufacturing. | 根据印度政府的说法，为所有数码产品提供动力的微处理器芯片不久后将会完全在印度制造。这是一个既大胆又不可思议的雄心壮志，充分说明了莫迪坚信自己能够推动印度进入先进技术制造业顶级行列的信念。 |
| In July, a legion of fawning foreign businessmen lined up onstage behind Mr. Modi in his home state of Gujarat. About $10 billion in subsidies are at stake, ready to fund 50 percent or even 70 percent of any company’s outlay. Anil Agarwal, the chairman of Vedanta, a British mining and metals group, told reporters to expect “Vedanta made-in-India chips” by 2025. | 今年7月，在莫迪的家乡古吉拉特邦，一群竞相示好的外国商人在莫迪身后排队上台。大约100亿美元的补贴归属悬而未决，这些补贴可以资助任何公司50%甚至70%的支出。英国矿业和金属集团韦丹塔董事长阿尼尔·阿加瓦尔告诉记者，预计到2025年“韦丹塔印度制造的芯片”将会问世。 |
| They have set their sights on a barren plain in Gujarat, Dholera (DOE-lay-rah), designated the future home of India’s first “semicon city.” It’s the size of Singapore. Slicing through sodden fields, ruler-straight new roads connect planning offices to power stations, freshwater canals from a diverted river and the gargantuan outline, traced in the dust, of an international airport. Dholera’s vast grid is otherwise virtually empty. | 他们把目光投向了古吉拉特邦的贫瘠平原多赫拉，这里被指定为印度首个“半导体城”的所在地。它的面积相当于新加坡。笔直的新路穿过泥泞的田野，将规划办公室与发电站、从改道河流中流出的淡水运河，以及飞沙中国际机场的巨大轮廓连接起来。除此之外，广袤的多赫拉几乎空空荡荡。 |
| Mr. Modi is betting he can lure private companies here, the middle of nowhere even by Indian standards, from not only across India but the world. | 莫迪赌的是他可以把来自印度乃至全世界的私营企业吸引到这里。即使按照印度的标准，这里也是个荒无人烟的地方。 |
| India’s traditional tech clusters around Bengaluru, a two-hour flight to the south, have established the country in the global semiconductor network by their work in designing chips, but not in making them. And in the past two years the government has laid heavy subsidies into making the country an electronics manufacturer. | 印度传统的科技集群位于班加罗尔，从这里坐飞机向南两小时即可到达，该集群在芯片设计（而非制造）方面的工作使印度在全球半导体网络中占据了一席之地。过去两年里，政府为使国家成为电子产品制造国提供了大量补贴。 |
| Actual chip-making is another challenge entirely. | 实际的芯片制造完全是另一个挑战。 |
| Since 2020 Mr. Modi has used “production-linked incentives” — the more you make, the bigger your government handout — to persuade mobile phone manufacturers to assemble more units in India than in any other country but China. But such work can be performed with semiskilled labor in ordinary factories. Chip-making, in its difficulty, occupies the opposite end of the spectrum. | 自2020年以来，莫迪一直使用“与生产挂钩的激励措施”——生产得越多，获得的政府补贴就越多——来鼓励手机制造商，目前在印度组装的手机数量超过除中国以外的任何其他国家。但这些工作可以在普通工厂用半熟练工人来完成。芯片制造在其难度上则要位居光谱的另一端。 |
| Today nearly all cutting-edge logic chips are made in Taiwan. As anxieties about China flare, and chips become more integral to every kind of technology, that seems increasingly risky to buyers and sellers alike. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, founded in 1987 by the chip legend Morris Chang, has been struggling to help America get its own fabrication plants or “fabs” going in Arizona, with help from President Biden’s subsidy-infused CHIPS Act. | 如今，几乎所有尖端逻辑芯片都在台湾制造。随着对中国的担忧加剧，以及芯片在各种技术中变得越来越不可或缺，这种情况对买家和卖家来说，风险似乎都越来越大。1987年由芯片界传奇人物张忠谋创立的台积电一直努力帮助美国在亚利桑那州建立自己的制造工厂或“晶圆厂”，拜登总统的《芯片法案》为其提供了补贴。 |
| India has no history of fabbing chips and virtually none of the hyperspecialized engineers and equipment needed to start. Still, it says it will make them here — and soon. It took TSMC and other Taiwanese companies decades, driven by government spending and countless billions in capital investment, to get where they are. | 印度没有制造芯片的历史，也几乎没有制造芯片所需的高度专业化的工程师和设备。尽管如此，印度表示将在本国生产芯片，而且很快就会投产。台积电和其他台湾公司花了几十年时间，在政府支出和无数资本投资的推动下，才取得了今天的成就。 |
| Since last October, when the United States decided to hobble the Chinese chip industry’s access to Western tools and workers, China has invested heavily on its own chip makers, vastly more than India has to spend on its companies. | 自去年10月美国决定阻止中国芯片行业获得西方的工具和人才以来，中国在自己的芯片制造商上投入了大量资金，远远超过了印度在本国公司上的投入。 |
| Mr. Agarwal of Vedanta, the conglomerate that hopes to launch India’s first semiconductor foundry, believes he can start making chips in two and a half years. To lead the charge he has hired David Reed, a veteran of chip-making firms around the globe including, like Mr. Chang, Texas Instruments, the American company that once was a world beater in chips. | 韦丹塔的阿加瓦尔相信，他可以在两年半的时间内开始生产芯片。韦丹塔希望在印度建立第一家半导体代工厂。他聘请了戴维·里德来领导这次行动，里德是全球芯片制造公司的资深人士，和张忠谋一样，他当年也在曾经是全球芯片霸主的美国德州仪器公司工作。 |
| Mr. Reed, a natural leader with a genial manner, intends to use his connections within the tightknit chip-making community. His assignment: Lure about 300 foreign specialists from fabs in East Asia and Europe to come and live in rural Gujarat and build a complex from scratch. He is having to offer his new hires three times (“3x,” he says quietly) their current salaries. They will be “mirrored” by an equal number of Indian staff, who will eventually take the reins. | 和蔼的里德是个天生的领导者，他打算利用自己在紧密联系的芯片制造界的关系。他的任务是从东亚和欧洲的工厂吸引大约300名外国专家来古吉拉特邦的农村生活，从零开始建造一个综合设施。他不得不给他的新员工提供三倍于他们目前的薪水（“三倍，”他平静地说）。他们将与同等数量的印度员工“互为镜像”，后者将最终在这家公司占主导地位。 |
| Ultimately the Mr. Reed’s hardest task may be persuading established players within the East-Asian-centric ecosystem to move to a place where they and their families had never considered living. The land-and-power infrastructure he finds in Gujarat will be appealing to his expatriate hires, but the housing, schools and nightlife are a work in progress. Yet, the homegrown candidate pool makes him optimistic: India graduates more than 1.4 million engineers a year, including many of the highest quality, just as Taiwan is running short of fresh talent. | 最终，里德最艰巨的任务可能是说服以东亚为中心的生态系统中的现有参与者搬到他们和家人从未考虑过居住的地方。他在古吉拉特邦找到的土地和电力基础设施将为他吸引外籍员工，但住房、学校和夜生活仍有待完善。然而，印度本土的人才储备让他感到乐观：印度每年有140多万名工程师毕业，其中包括许多最优秀的人才，而台湾却缺乏新鲜人才。 |
| Making microchips also requires a lot of bespoke ingredients. Mr. Vaishnaw, the government official in charge, said India’s biggest chemical plants were near Dholera and could pump out the specialized gases and liquids needed to run any chip fab. Seaports and railheads can ensure high levels of connectivity. | 制造微芯片也需要大量的定制原料。负责该项目的政府官员瓦什瑙说，印度最大的化工厂就在多赫拉附近，可以大量生产任何芯片工厂运转所需的特殊气体和液体。海港和铁路可以确保高度的连通性。 |
| India’s technology scene is exulting in the limelight. Its Chandrayaan-3 lunar lander reached the south pole of the moon in late August. Mr. Modi saw the Group of 20 summit as a platform to show off India’s digital-public infrastructure. | 印度的科技领域正成为人们关注的焦点。印度的月船三号着陆器于8月底抵达月球的南极。莫迪将20国集团峰会视为展示印度数字公共基础设施的平台。 |
| Even more of the urgent interest in India’s making chips has to do with China, which is not the draw for investment that it was for the past three decades. Mr. Modi has been telling nations not aligned with Beijing that India has an important role to play in “building a trusted supply chain.” | 对印度制造芯片的迫切兴趣更多与中国有关，中国对投资的吸引力已不像过去30年那样大。莫迪一直在告诉那些不与北京结盟的国家，印度在“建立可信赖的供应链”方面可以发挥重要作用。 |
| It was in 2015, early in Mr. Modi’s first term as prime minister, that he announced a “Make in India” program, the broader industrial push that frames the current chips initiative. But as a share of the economy, manufacturing has since languished, stuck around 15 percent. Smaller Asian countries, like Bangladesh and Vietnam, have run circles around India in most categories, exporting greater quantities of goods like garments and electrical equipment. | 2015年，在莫迪第一个总理任期初期的莫迪宣布了一项名为“印度制造”的计划，这一更广泛的工业推动计划为当前的芯片计划提供了框架。但从那时起，制造业在印度经济中所占的比重一直萎靡不振，停留在15%左右。孟加拉国和越南等较小的亚洲国家在大多数类别上都超过了印度，出口了更多的商品，如服装和电气设备。 |
| India excels in the export of intellectually demanding services and in “deep tech.” With the notable exception of pharmaceuticals, its manufacturing firms have mostly failed to compete in the international arena. | 印度在出口知识要求较高的服务和“深度技术”方面表现出色，但除了制药之外，其制造企业大多无法在国际舞台上竞争。 |
| Some business leaders — and not only Mr. Modi’s naysayers — argue that India’s government, in identifying logic-chip foundries as its goal, has bit off more than it can chew. Certainly the time frame announced by Mr. Agarwal’s Vedanta is highly ambitious, if not implausible. That does not mean there aren’t gains to be made: Expanding India’s role within the world’s chip supply chain looks like a much better bet. Indian officials don’t put it this way, but it’s a kind of Plan B to Mr. Modi’s chip-making moonshot. | 一些商界领袖——不仅仅是莫迪的反对者——认为，印度政府将逻辑芯片代工厂确定为目标，已经超出了它的能力范围。当然，阿加瓦尔的韦丹塔公司宣布的时间表不说难以置信，至少也是太过高远了。但这并不意味着没有收获：扩大印度在全球芯片供应链中的作用似乎是一个更好的选择——印度官员虽然没有这么说，但这是莫迪芯片制造大计划的一种备选方案。 |
| For example, Micron Technology, a memory-chip firm based in Boise, Idaho, has committed $2.7 billion to another industrial site in Gujarat, 60 miles from Dholera. It is supposed to become a locus for ATMP work, chip jargon for “assembly, testing, marking and packaging.” These are the advanced processes integral to making modern chips powerful. | 例如，总部位于爱达荷州博伊西的存储芯片公司美光科技已承诺向古吉拉特邦的另一个工业基地投资27亿美元，该基地距离多赫拉96公里。它将成为ATMP工作的基地——ATMP是芯片术语，意思是“组装、测试、标记和封装”。这些都是令现代芯片如此强大所必需的先进工艺。 |
| Malaysia does some of that kind of work now, and India could nibble away at its market there while doubling down on chip design. | 马来西亚目前正在做从事这类工作，印度可以在加大芯片设计投入的同时，蚕食马来西亚的市场。 |
| Whether these plans succeed or fail, they make apparent a giant scale of ambition. They also make it clear that India sees a muscular role for the state, with a mixture of tariffs and subsidies to help its national champions off the ground and into global competition. That kind of state capitalism puts it in company with China, but also the United States and other big countries that have belatedly engaged in versions of the same. And that, in the end, might be Mr. Modi’s supreme goal. | 无论这些计划是成功还是失败，它们都显示出远大的抱负。它们还清楚地表明，印度认为政府应该扮演强大的角色，通过关税和补贴的组合，来帮助本国的拳头企业起步，并参与全球竞争。这种国家资本主义使它与中国、美国和其他迟迟才开始实行同样政策的大国并驾齐驱。归根结底，这可能才是莫迪的最高目标。 |
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