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| PARIS — Mikhail S. Gorbachev believed the Soviet Union could be preserved without recourse to violence. This proved to be a misunderstanding of the nature of the repressive empire he ruled. The Soviet imperium collapsed in 1991, its ending embraced by the West as a victory for freedom and liberal democracy. | 巴黎——米哈伊尔·S·戈尔巴乔夫相信，可以在不诉诸暴力的情况下保住苏联。事实证明，这误解了他所统治的专制帝国的本质。1991年，苏维埃政权解体，其结局被西方视为自由和自由主义民主的胜利。 |
| “Every Soviet leader before him knew you had to send in the tanks from time to time,” said Carl Bildt, a former prime minister of Sweden. “In a way, Gorbachev’s greatness lay in the fact that he was wrong.” | “在他之前的每一位苏联领导人都知道，必须时不时地派出坦克，”瑞典前首相卡尔·比尔特说。“在某种程度上，戈尔巴乔夫的伟大就在于他错了。” |
| If Poland held its first free elections since 1945 in the summer of 1989, if Czechoslovakia had a “velvet” and not a violent revolution later that year, if the Berlin Wall fell bloodlessly on Nov. 9, 1989, and if half a million Soviet troops traipsed home from Eastern Europe without firing a shot, it is because Mr. Gorbachev turned his back on the use of force. | 波兰在1989年夏天举行了1945年以来的第一次自由选举，捷克斯洛伐克在那一年晚些时候发生了一场“天鹅绒革命”而不是暴力革命，柏林墙在1989年11月9日倒塌，没有流血，50万苏联军队不开一枪就从东欧撤回国，这些都是因为戈尔巴乔夫拒绝使用武力。 |
| “It is evident, for example, that force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be, instruments of foreign policy,” Mr. Gorbachev told the United Nations on Dec. 7, 1988 — a message that never reached the in tray of Russia’s current president, Vladimir V. Putin. | 1988年12月7日，戈尔巴乔夫在联合国发言称：“例如，武力和武力威胁显然不能也不应该成为外交政策的工具。”这一信息从未传到俄罗斯现总统普京的文件托盘上。 |
| Europe became whole thanks to Mr. Gorbachev. It is less clear what the West gave in return. | 多亏了戈尔巴乔夫，欧洲才得以保持完整。西方国家的回报是什么就不那么清晰了。 |
| The open question, as the continent is again torn by war, is whether the United States and its allies, giddy with the possibilities opened up by Mr. Gorbachev’s liberalizing policies of glasnost and perestroika, simply gobbled up his gift without serious reflection on its implications for Western security and societies. | 在这片大陆再次被战争撕裂之际，一个悬而未决的问题是，戈尔巴乔夫的改革与开放自由化政策所带来的各种可能性是否令美国及其盟友过于飘飘然，他们是否只是吞下了他的礼物，而没有认真思考它对西方安全和社会的影响。 |
| President Bill Clinton suggested in 1997 that great-power territorial politics were over. A new era had dawned, he said, in which “enlightened self-interest, as well as shared values, will compel countries to define their greatness in more constructive ways.” | 1997年，美国总统克林顿表示，大国领土政治已经结束。他说，一个新时代已经到来，在这个时代里，“开明的利己以及共同的价值观将迫使各国以更具建设性的方式定义自身的伟大。” |
| A quarter-century later, Mr. Putin defines greatness through force in the pursuit of restored empire. But Mr. Clinton’s was not an isolated Panglossian view in the West in the decade after Mr. Gorbachev’s actions led to the end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet Union. | 四分之一个世纪后，普京将“伟大”定义为追求恢复帝国的武力。但在戈尔巴乔夫的行动导致冷战结束和苏联解体后的十年里，西方并非只有克林顿持这种过分乐观的观点。 |
| There was a feeling that history would naturally flow the West’s way because the chief ideological alternative in Moscow had crumbled. There was, it seemed, no alternative to the march of liberalism. Some imagined a “Third Way,” combining the best of capitalism and socialism. It went nowhere. | 当时人们有一种感觉，历史将自然而然地按照西方的方式发展，因为莫斯科的主要意识形态选择已经崩溃。在朝着自由主义前进的道路上，似乎没有其他选择。一些人设想了“第三条道路”，将资本主义和社会主义的精华结合起来。但也没有什么结果。 |
| This was an idealistic, and ultimately dangerous, mind-set because it tended to give the failings of Western societies a pass. Still, it was no more idealistic than Mr. Gorbachev’s belief in a reformed communist society that was more open to individual initiative, more democratic, and ultimately more free. | 这是一种理想主义的思维模式，最终变得危险，因为它倾向于对西方社会的失败过于宽容。不过，这并不比戈尔巴乔夫的信念更理想主义，他相信，改革后的共产主义社会更欢迎个人的主动性、更民主、最终更加自由。 |
| In many ways, as Michel Duclos, a special adviser to the Institut Montaigne think-tank in Paris said, “Gorbachev was a Soviet Dubcek” — a reference to Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovak leader whose attempt to bring “socialism with a human face” to his country in 1968 led Soviet tanks to rumble into Prague. | 在许多方面，正如巴黎智库蒙田研究所特别顾问米歇尔·杜克洛所说的那样，“戈尔巴乔夫是苏维埃的杜布切克”——他指的是捷克斯洛伐克领导人亚历山大·杜布切克。1968年，杜布切克试图把“有人性的社会主义”带到他的国家，导致苏联坦克隆隆地开进布拉格。 |
| In the same 1988 speech to the United Nations, Mr. Gorbachev also said something long unthinkable in a Soviet leader: “We are, of course, far from claiming to have infallible truth.” | 1988年在联合国的同一次演讲中，戈尔巴乔夫还说了一些在苏联领导人当中长期以来无法想象的事情：“当然，我们远不能自认掌握绝对真理。” |
| Not only did Mr. Gorbachev, with a few exceptions, renounce violence, he renounced the infallibility of communist doctrine, the belief that the Soviet state had a monopoly on truth and could create a workers’ paradise, by the gun and the gulag if necessary. | 除了少数例外，戈尔巴乔夫不仅放弃了暴力，还放弃了共产主义教条的绝对正确性，即相信苏维埃政权垄断了真理，可以创造一个工人的天堂，必要时可以使用枪炮和古拉格作为手段。 |
| “This was Mr. Gorbachev’s double renunciation, and of course what Putin is doing today is precisely the contrary,” said Jacques Rupnik, a French political scientist focused on central Europe. “Gorbachev detonated something he could not control. He made history but he did not know what history he was making.” | “这是戈尔巴乔夫的双重舍弃，当然，今天普京的所作所为则恰恰相反，”关注中欧问题的法国政治学家雅克·鲁普尼克说。“戈尔巴乔夫引爆了他无法控制的东西。他创造了历史，但他当时并不知道自己正在创造什么样的历史。” |
| The history Mr. Gorbachev dreamed of was set out in part in an address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1989. He spoke of a “common European home” and a “restructuring of the international order existing in Europe that would put European common values in the forefront and make it possible to replace the traditional balance of forces with a balance of interests.” | 1989年，戈尔巴乔夫在欧洲委员会议会大会发表的演讲中部分阐述了他梦想中的历史。他谈到了一个“共同的欧洲家园”，以及“对欧洲现有国际秩序的重组，将欧洲的共同价值观放在首位，使利益平衡取代传统的力量平衡成为可能”。 |
| It was necessary, he said, that “the idea of European unification should be collectively thought over once again.” | 他说，有必要“共同对欧洲统一的理念进行再一次的思考”。 |
| This is the great chimera that has hung over Europe for more than three decades now. If the Cold War had ended, if the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had been disbanded, could some new architecture be imagined in which Russia was not a rival, let alone an enemy? | 这就是30多年来笼罩着欧洲的一大妄想。如果冷战已经结束，如果以苏联为首的华约组织已经解散，是否可以想象一些新的架构，其中俄罗斯不是一个对手，更不是一个敌人？ |
| Even in 2019, when he invited Mr. Putin to France to discuss a reordering of a Europe with a NATO that had suffered a “brain death,” Emmanuel Macron, the French president, said: “Russia is European, very profoundly, and we believe in the Europe that stretches from Lisbon to Vladivostok.” | 甚至在2019年，法国总统埃马克龙邀请普京前往法国，与已经“脑死亡”的北约讨论欧洲秩序的重组时，他还说：“俄罗斯是欧洲的，这一点根深蒂固，我们相信欧洲是从里斯本一直延伸到符拉迪沃斯托克的。” |
| The war in Ukraine has changed Mr. Macron’s thinking. Of late, he has been forceful in denouncing Russian imperialism and violence. Between Lisbon and Vladivostok, there lies European soil bloodied yet again. | 乌克兰战争已经改变了马克龙的想法。近来，他强烈谴责俄罗斯的帝国主义和暴力行径。横亘于里斯本和符拉迪沃斯托克之间的欧洲大地再次沾上了鲜血。 |
| While it is tantalizing to reflect on the “common European home” imagined by Mr. Gorbachev, the fact is Russia after Mr. Gorbachev has not wanted to become a normal nation state that does not pose a threat to its neighbors. | 思量戈尔巴乔夫所设想的“共同的欧洲家园”确实诱人，但事实是，戈尔巴乔夫之后的俄罗斯从来就不想成为一个与邻国相安无事的普通民族国家。 |
| “It has wanted an imperialist czar,” said Mr. Duclos. | “它一直想要一个帝国主义的沙皇，”杜克洛说。 |
| Mr. Putin, who once said “the borders of Russia do not end,” appears to have been proved right in his conviction that an imagined “Russkiy mir,” or Russian world, stretching far and wide over countries including Ukraine, is an idea that lies deep in the national psyche. | 普京曾说过“俄罗斯的边界没有尽头”，不过事实似乎证明，他对横跨乌克兰等国的“俄罗斯世界”(Russkiy mir)的设想深植于俄罗斯民族心理之中。 |
| “What Russians cannot accept about Gorbachev is that he gave away the empire for nothing,” said Mr. Rupnik. | “俄罗斯人不能接受戈尔巴乔夫的一点是，他白白放弃了帝国，”鲁普尼克说。 |
| But the attempt to restore it has been costly. If Poland and Hungary sought NATO’s protection by joining the alliance, it was for a reason. Just as Russia has forged a passionate Ukrainian nationhood through its invasion, so it has redoubled the relevance of NATO, the very organization it believes should have disappeared with the Soviet Union. | 但帝国复辟的代价高昂。说波兰和匈牙利加入北约是为了寻求北约的保护并非没有来由。就像俄罗斯通过入侵激活了乌克兰的国家意识一样，它也让北约的意义获得重生。俄罗斯认为，北约应该随着苏联的解体而消失。 |
| So it is that as 100 million central Europeans are free thanks to Mr. Gorbachev, the united European continent at peace he imagined seems more distant than ever at the moment of his death. History does not move in straight lines. | 因此，由于戈尔巴乔夫，一亿中欧人获得了自由，在他去世的那一刻，他脑海中的那个和平统一的欧洲大陆似乎比以往任何时候都更加遥远。历史不会直线前进。 |
| For China, which crushed protest at Tiananmen Square just as Central Europe was breaking free of its Soviet shackles in 1989, the lesson was clear. Mr. Gorbachev was weak; the only way to modernize was through authoritarian reform backed by force. | 对中国来说，这个教训是显而易见的——1989年，就在中欧挣脱苏联的桎梏之际，中国对天安门广场上的抗议活动进行了镇压。戈尔巴乔夫太软弱；实现现代化的唯一途径是以武力为后盾的威权改革。 |
| But the West’s debt to Mr. Gorbachev for bringing down a totalitarian empire is enormous. “He was a man of peace, although bitter at the end of his life, who willed the end to the Cold War and reduced the risk of nuclear confrontation,” said Sylvie Bermann, a former French ambassador to Moscow. | 但西方对戈尔巴乔夫的亏欠是巨大的，因为他推翻的是一个极权帝国。前法国驻莫斯科大使西尔维·伯曼说：“他是一个和平之人，虽然晚年满腹牢骚，但他愿意结束冷战，并降低核对抗的风险。” |
| When President John F. Kennedy confronted the imminent Soviet threat to a free Berlin in 1961, he said: “We cannot negotiate with people who say what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.” | 1961年，面对苏联对一个自由柏林的紧迫威胁，约翰·F·肯尼迪总统说：“我们不能与那些说‘属于我的不能谈，属于你的可以谈’的人谈判。” |
| That was Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev’s line. Mr. Gorbachev favored negotiation over tanks, changing the world and losing his country. | 那是赫鲁晓夫会说的话。戈尔巴乔夫倾向于谈判而不是坦克，他改变了世界，也失去了他的国家。 |
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