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| WASHINGTON — For years the deliberate “strategic ambiguity” in Washington’s China policy has left unclear how the United States would respond to a full-scale, amphibious invasion of Taiwan. | 华盛顿——多年来，华盛顿对华政策中有意而为的“战略模糊”令人无法确定，在台湾遭到全面的两栖入侵时，美国会如何回应。 |
| But an equally hard question — maybe harder, in the minds of many senior White House and defense officials — is how to respond to a slow squeeze of the island, in which Chinese forces cut off much of the access to it, physically or digitally. | 但有一个同样难以回答的问题（在许多白宫高级官员和国防官员的心目中，这个问题可能更棘手），那就是要如何应对台湾受到的缓慢逼迫，在这个过程中，中国军队将用实体或数字手段切断进入该岛的大部分通道。 |
| That question may soon be tested for the first time in a quarter of a century. China’s declaration during Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit that it would begin live-fire military exercises in six locations encircling the island could set up the largest crisis in the Taiwan Strait since 1996, when President Bill Clinton ordered an American aircraft carrier to an entry to the strait. | 这个问题可能很快就会受到四分之一世纪以来的第一次考验。中国在众议院议长南希·佩洛西访问期间宣布，将在环绕台湾的六个地点举行实弹军事演习，这可能会引发自1996年以来最大的台海危机，当时克林顿总统下令一艘美国航空母舰进入台湾海峡。 |
| But those exercises were significantly farther from Taiwan’s shores than the series the Chinese government has warned mariners and aircraft that it plans. And it took place in a far more benign strategic environment, back when China’s entry into the global economy was supposed to modify its behavior, and when Mr. Clinton would tell Chinese students that the spread of the internet would foster freedom and dissent. It was also when China’s military packed a fraction of the punch it now boasts, including anti-ship missiles developed to deter American warships from getting close. | 但那个时候的演习与中国政府这次警告船只和飞机它计划进行的演习地点相比，距离台湾海岸要远得多。当时的战略环境与今天相比，要温和得多，外界相信中国进入全球经济后应该会改变自己的行为，而且克林顿在向中国学生发表演讲的时候告诉他们，互联网的普及将促进自由和异议。同样也是在那个时候，中国军队只拥有它现在所号称实力的一小部分，比如为了阻止美国军舰靠近，它现在已经研发出了反舰导弹。 |
| Administration officials say that based on their assessments a full cutoff of access to Taiwan is unlikely — in large part because it would hurt China’s own economy at a time of severe economic slowdown. On Friday, the Group of 7 industrialized nations, the core of the Western alliance, warned China not to retaliate for Ms. Pelosi’s visit, clearly an effort to suggest that China would be widely condemned for overreacting, much as Russia was for its invasion of Ukraine. | 政府官员表示，根据他们的评估，完全切断进入台湾的可能性不大——这在很大程度上是因为在经济严重放缓之际，这将损害中国自身的经济。上周五，西方联盟的核心七国集团警告中国，不要对佩洛西的访问进行报复，这显然是在暗示中国将因反应过度而受到广泛谴责，一如俄罗斯入侵乌克兰。 |
| But American officials say they worry that the events of the next few days could trigger an unintended confrontation between China’s forces and Taiwan’s, especially if the Chinese military launches a missile over the island, or if an incursion into disputed airspace leads to a midair conflict. Something similar happened 20 years ago, when a Chinese military aircraft collided with an American intelligence-gathering plane. | 但美国官员表示，他们担心未来几天的事件可能引发中国军队与台湾军队之间的擦枪走火，特别是如果中国军方在台湾上空发射导弹，或者入侵有争议的领空时导致空中冲突。20年前发生过类似的事情，当时一架中国的军用飞机与一架美国侦察机相撞。 |
| As the military exercises began early Wednesday, White House and Pentagon officials were monitoring the situation closely, trying to figure out if China was sending forces into each of the areas near Taiwan’s coast it has declared closed. But their assessment was that China’s strategy is to intimidate and coerce, without triggering a direct conflict. | 军事演习从周三早些时候开始，中国宣布关闭台湾海岸附近的几个区域，白宫和五角大楼正在密切关注局势发展，试图弄清楚中国是否正在向每个区域派遣部队。但他们的评估是，中国目前的战略是为了恐吓和胁迫，而不是引发直接冲突。 |
| Outside experts were more concerned that the exercise could escalate. | 外部专家更担心演习可能升级。 |
| “This is one of the scenarios that is difficult to deal with,’’ said Bonny Lin, who directed the Taiwan desk at the Pentagon and held other defense positions before moving to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, where she heads the China Power Project. “If a military exercise transitions to a blockade, when does it become clear that the exercise is now a blockade? Who should be the first to respond? Taiwan’s forces? The United States? It’s not clear.” | “这是难以应对的情况之一，”华盛顿的战略与国际研究中心中国力量项目负责人林洋说。她曾在五角大楼领导台湾事务部，并担任过其他国防职务。“如果军事演习转变为封锁，那么何时才能明确演习已经成为封锁？谁应该做出第一个回应？台湾军队？美国？目前还不清楚。” |
| An exercise-turned-blockade is one of many scenarios that get “war-gamed” in Washington regularly, as American officials try to map out options before a crisis strikes. But nothing really replicates a real-life confrontation. | 美国官员试图在危机发生之前制定各种选项，由演习转变为封锁是华盛顿经常进行“模拟演习”的众多情景设定之一。但没有什么能真正再现现实中的对抗。 |
| Mr. Biden, aides say, would have to try to walk the delicate line between avoiding folding to the Chinese and avoiding escalation. | 助手们说，拜登必须努力在避免向中国屈服和避免事态升级之间保持微妙的平衡。 |
| It is even more complicated by the continuing debate over how to help Taiwan become a “porcupine,’’ or a country too well defended for China to invade. For all the talk of F-16 sales to Taiwan — its fleet is supposed to top 200 of the fighter aircraft by 2026 — there is growing worry that Taiwan is buying the wrong kind of gear to defend itself, and that it needs to learn some lessons from Ukraine. | 关于如何帮助台湾成为“豪猪”（严密防御以至于中国无法入侵）的持续辩论使情况变得更加复杂。尽管有许多向台湾出售F-16的讨论——预计到2026年，台湾将拥有超过200架该机型——但人们越来越担心的是，台湾购买了错误的装备来保护自己，它需要从乌克兰那里吸取一些经验。 |
| It is hardly a new debate. Two years ago, a senior defense official, David F. Helvey, warned that as China’s ability to choke off the island rises, Taiwan itself can, “through smart investment, send a clear signal to Beijing that Taiwan’s society and its armed forces are committed to the defense of Taiwan.” But he warned that the sums that Taiwan’s government was committing to acquiring new defensive technology were insufficient for a resilient defense. | 这样的辩论早已有之。两年前，高级国防官员戴维·赫尔维就曾警告，随着中国遏制该岛的能力增强，台湾本身可以“通过明智的投入，向北京发出一个明确信号，表明台湾社会及其武装部队致力于保卫台湾”。但他警告，台湾政府为获取新的防御技术而投入的资金不足以建立有弹性的防御。 |
| The result has been a steady drumbeat from Washington urging Taiwan’s leadership to invest less in expensive F-16 fighters and more on what Mr. Helvey called “large numbers of small things,’’ the formula that later helped Ukraine resist Russian forces. | 结果是，华盛顿一直鼓励敦促台湾领导层减少对昂贵的F-16战斗机的投资，更多地投资于赫尔维所说的“大量小型武器”，后来帮助乌克兰抵抗俄罗斯军队采用的也是这个方案。 |
| That list includes mobile cruise missiles for coastal defense, naval mines, small fast-attack craft and mobile artillery. | 这份清单包括用于海岸防御的移动巡航导弹、水雷、小型快速攻击艇和移动火炮。 |
| President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan has expressed support for the so-called “asymmetric” strategy and has moved in recent years to increase the defense budget and buy many of the small, mobile weapons that U.S. officials have recommended, like Harpoon missiles. But she has encountered resistance at times from some Taiwanese military officials, who argue that some conventional weapons systems are still necessary to prepare for different scenarios. They have also argued that without an explicit security guarantee from the United States, it would be too risky for Taiwan to give up its lethal weapons. | 台湾总统蔡英文支持所谓“不对称”战略，并在近年增加了国防预算，购买了许多美国官员建议的小型机动武器，比如鱼叉导弹。但她有时会遇到一些来自台湾军方的抵制，他们认为，为了应对不同情况，一些常规武器系统仍然必要。他们还认为，如果没有美国的明确安全保障，台湾放弃致命武器的风险太大。 |
| That view has changed somewhat in recent months as the war in Ukraine has jolted Taiwan’s military and the public, prompting a greater embrace of the “porcupine” strategy. But that war has also depleted stocks and strained production capacity among American and allied defense contractors, meaning Taiwan may need to wait for several years. And that delay gives China an opening. | 近几个月来，随着乌克兰战争震动台湾军方和公众，促使台湾更广泛地接受“豪猪”战略，这种观点有所改变。但这场战争也耗尽了美国和盟国国防承包商的库存，并导致生产能力紧张，这意味着台湾可能需要等上几年。这种延迟给了中国机会。 |
| Moreover, Taiwan’s defense budget hovers at around $17 billion a year, though it has committed to spend an additional $8 billion on armaments over the next several years. By comparison, Congress recently apportioned $52 billion in aid for Ukraine — which doesn’t have Taiwan’s revenue streams to pay for its own defense — and China spends on the order of $230 billion annually. | 此外，台湾的国防预算徘徊在每年170亿美元左右，尽管它已经承诺在未来几年内增加80亿美元的军备开支。相比之下，美国国会最近拨款520亿美元援助乌克兰——乌克兰没有台湾那样的收入来源支付国防费用——而中国每年的军费支出约为2300亿美元。 |
| Some also say that what Taiwan needs from the United States is not just weapon sales, but other forms of support, ranging from military technology to operational exchanges and training. | 也有人说，台湾需要从美国获得的不只是武器销售，还有其他形式的支持，从军事技术到作战交流和培训。 |
| While Taiwan’s military is sometimes allowed to participate in defense symposiums, it is rarely invited to join large multinational military exercises because most countries do not officially recognize it as a nation. And while Washington has gradually ramped up training of Taiwanese forces on the island and in the United States in recent years, the island’s mandatory military service and its reservist program are still seen as insufficiently rigorous. | 虽然台湾军方有时被允许参加防务研讨会，但它很少被邀请参加大型多国军事演习，因为大多数国家没有正式承认它是一个国家。尽管华盛顿近年来逐步加强了台湾军队在台湾和美国的训练，但岛内的强制兵役和预备役计划仍被认为不够严格。 |
| “The U.S. could help us learn how to train more efficiently and mobilize reserve forces more quickly,” said Ou Si-fu, a research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think tank affiliated with Taiwan’s defense ministry. “They could also help more in terms of technology transfer, to support our indigenous weapons development programs.” | “美国可以帮助我们学习如何更有效地训练和更快地调动后备部队，”台湾国防部下属的智库国防与安全研究所的研究员欧锡富说。“他们还可以在技术转让方面提供更多帮助，支持我们的本土武器发展计划。” |
| Of course, defending against invasion bears little resemblance to defending against a blockade. Executing a blockade is even harder. | 当然，防御入侵和防御封锁没有什么相似之处。执行封锁就更难了。 |
| “Threatening a blockade and actually initiating a blockade are two very different things,” Eric Sayers, a former senior adviser to the U.S. Pacific Command who is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. | “威胁封锁和实际上启动封锁是两回事，”美国太平洋司令部前高级顾问、美国企业研究所研究员埃里克·塞耶斯说。 |
| Mr. Sayers said China has long had the ability to effectively encircle Taiwan if it chose to do so, so the capability itself isn’t a surprise. | 他表示，如果中国选择这样做，它早就有能力有效包围台湾，因此这种能力本身并不令人意外。 |
| “Despite all the threats Beijing has made in recent weeks, it would still be very difficult for the P.L.A. Navy and costly to China’s economy to maintain a blockade for an extended period of time,” Mr. Sayers added, referring to the People’s Liberation Army. “What hurts Taipei’s economy has a similar effect on Beijing.” | “尽管北京在最近几周发出了种种威胁，但解放军的海军要想长时间维持封锁，仍然会非常困难，中国经济也会付出高昂的代价，”塞耶斯还说。“伤害台北经济的事情，对北京也会有类似的影响。” |
| Mr. Sayers continued, “What is most significant about China’s response is that it is giving us a preview of how the P.L.A. might deploy an indirect blockade against Taiwan in the future to ratchet up the pressure near an election or other political crisis.” | 塞耶斯还说，“关于中国的反应，最重要的是，它让我们看到了解放军未来可能如何对台湾部署间接封锁，以便在选举或其他政治危机临近时加大对台湾的压力。” |
| “Instead of announcing a military blockade they may instead announce an extended military exercise around Taiwan that closes or disrupts shipping routes for 30, 60, 90 days. This makes it less a military operation and more a form of legal warfare to justify an indirect blockade for a duration that Beijing can manipulate.” | “他们可能不会宣布军事封锁，而是宣布在台湾周围长时间军事演习，关闭或中断航道30天、60天或90天。这与其说是军事行动，不如说是一种法律战，以证明北京可以进行一段时期间接封锁的正当性，”他说。 |
| Others say the United States could do more to bolster Taiwan’s security by helping it better integrate into the global economic system. Taiwanese officials and analysts argue that strengthening trade links and possibly passing a bilateral trade agreement could help the island reduce its reliance on China, currently its largest trade partner. But China would undoubtedly consider that an aggressive act. | 也有人说，美国可以通过帮助台湾更好地融入全球经济体系来加强台湾的安全。台湾官员和分析人士认为，加强贸易联系，并可能通过一项双边贸易协定，可能有助于台湾减少对中国大陆的依赖。中国大陆目前是台湾最大的贸易伙伴。但中国无疑会认为这是一种咄咄逼人的行为。 |
| The geopolitical risks of Taiwan’s dependence on the Chinese market were on display this week when just hours after Ms. Pelosi arrived in Taiwan, Beijing moved to suspend exports of natural sand to the island — key for construction — and banned imports from Taiwan of certain types of fruit and fish. | 本周，佩洛西抵达台湾仅数小时后，北京就采取行动，暂停向台湾出口用于建筑的天然砂，并禁止从台湾进口某些种类的水果和鱼类，由此显示出台湾依赖大陆市场的地缘政治风险。 |
| “Economic security is so important to Taiwan’s survival as a democracy,” said Vincent Chao, former political director at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington. | “经济安全对台湾作为一个民主国家的生存至关重要，”驻美国台北经济文化代表处前政治组组长赵怡翔表示。 |
| Diversifying American support for Taiwan from arms sales is crucial not only to better defend against China, but also to boost morale for a fellow democratic partner, said Mark Stokes, executive director of the Project 2049 Institute, a defense research group in Arlington, Virginia. | 位于弗吉尼亚州阿灵顿的国防研究机构2049计划研究所的执行主任马克·斯托克斯说，美国对台湾的支持需要多样化，不应仅仅局限于军售，这不仅对更好地抵御中国至关重要，也能提振一个民主伙伴的士气。 |
| “We shouldn’t just be cramming weapons down their throat and robbing them of their agency in terms of determining what their own defense requirements are,” Mr. Stokes said. “What Taiwan needs most from the U.S. is to be treated, as much as possible given the constraints, as a normal partner with respect.” | “我们不应该只是把武器强塞给他们，剥夺他们决定自己国防需求的权力，”斯托克斯说。“台湾最需要从美国得到的是，在有限的条件下，尽可能把它当作一个正常的合作伙伴，给予尊重。” |
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