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| In 2019, the White House declared that phone and internet equipment from Chinese technology companies should be ripped from every corner of the U.S. because it posed an unacceptable risk of snooping or sabotage by the Chinese government. | 2019年，白宫宣布美国需要清除所有来自中国科技企业的电话和互联网设备，因为这些设备构成了被中国政府嗅探或破坏的风险，是不可接受的。 |
| More than three years later, most of that equipment remains. | 三年多过去后，大部分设备仍然得以保留。 |
| Today I’m going to look at how the U.S. has handled the equipment from two Chinese companies, Huawei and ZTE. I’ll explore what this can tell us about America’s ability to effectively deal with concerns about other Chinese technology, such as apps like TikTok, and its efforts to become more self-sufficient in computer chip manufacturing and design. | 今天，我要看一看美国是如何处理华为和中兴这两家中国公司的设备的。我将探讨的是，对这方面的关注可以让我们了解到美国对其他中国技术，包括TikTok等应用程序的担忧进行有效处理的能力，以及美国在计算机芯片制造和设计方面变得更加自给自足的努力。 |
| Technology will no longer be an American near-monopoly, as it has been for the past half-century, and the U.S. needs to figure out and execute plans to help it benefit from global technology developments while preserving America’s safety and innovation. But the story of Chinese equipment shows we have a long way to go. | 技术将不再像过去半个世纪那样近乎被美国垄断，美国需要制定并执行计划，帮助其从全球技术发展中受益，同时保护美国的安全和创新。但中国设备这个例子表明，我们还有很长的路要走。 |
| Some U.S. officials believe that the continued use of gear from Huawei and ZTE is a grave threat to America’s national security. Other policy experts that I’ve spoken to say that it presents a negligible risk and that it might not be worth trying to remove all the equipment right away. | 一些美国官员认为，继续使用华为和中兴的设备是对美国国家安全的严重威胁。而与我交谈过的其他政策专家说，它带来的风险可以忽略不计，而且试图立即移除所有设备也许并不值得。 |
| What’s clear is that the U.S. said the Chinese technology ban was urgent and then failed to make it stick. | 很明显，美国表示要对中国技术采取紧急禁令，但未能坚持下去。 |
| Removing Huawei and ZTE equipment, which is used mostly in rural areas of the U.S., was never going to be simple, and pandemic-related complications made things worse. But critics of the U.S. approach also said that the way officials handled it hurt American businesses and consumers without making the country much safer. | 华为和中兴设备主要在美国农村地区使用，将它们移除绝非易事，而大流行带来的麻烦使情况变得更糟。但对美国做法持批评态度的人士也表示，官员的处理方式伤害了美国企业和消费者，却没有让这个国家更安全。 |
| Let me backtrack to how this all started. For about a decade, U.S. officials said repeatedly that phone and internet equipment from Huawei and ZTE could be used as gateways for Chinese government spying or to disrupt essential U.S. communications. Those warnings persuaded the largest U.S. phone and internet companies, such as AT&T and Verizon, to stay away from buying such equipment. | 让我们回到这一切的起点。过去大约10年里，美国官员反复声称，华为和中兴通讯的电话和互联网设备可能被用作中国政府进行间谍活动或破坏美国重要通信的途径。这些警告说服了AT&T和Verizon等美国最大的电话和互联网公司不再购买此类设备。 |
| Nearly everyone in the U.S. government and business community who works on this issue says that was the right thing to do. (There is less consensus on the wisdom of restrictions on Huawei smartphones.) Huawei and ZTE have consistently said that those security concerns were unfounded and that the U.S. government has never provided public proof of its allegations. | 美国政府和商界中几乎所有致力于此问题的人都表示这么做是对的。（限制华为智能手机是否是明智之举则缺乏共识。）华为和中兴通讯一直表示，这些安全担忧是没有根据的，并且美国政府从未公开证据证明其指控。 |
| Smaller companies, mostly in rural areas, weren’t as strongly discouraged from buying Huawei and ZTE equipment. A sizable minority of them continued to buy items from the companies, such as devices similar to home internet modems and gear to bounce mobile signals around. | 主要分布在农村地区的小公司对华为和中兴设备并无强烈抵触。相当一部分公司继续购买这两家的产品，例如家用互联网调制解调器和用于移动信号反射的设备。 |
| The U.S. government declared that was too much of a risk. Starting in 2019, the U.S. effectively ordered all companies with Huawei and ZTE gear to replace all of it. The government promised taxpayer money to help pay for comparable equipment from U.S. or European companies. | 美国政府宣称风险太大。从2019年开始，美国实际上已经下令所有使用华为和中兴设备的公司都需要更换。政府承诺向纳税人提供资金，以帮助购买美国或欧洲公司的同类设备。 |
| The Federal Communications Commission once estimated the cost of replacing Chinese gear to be about $2 billion. An updated estimate disclosed last month showed it was about $5 billion. It will take time for the F.C.C. and Congress to figure out how to pay the amounts small telecom companies say they need. In the meantime, many such providers haven’t even started replacing Huawei and ZTE equipment, as Politico reported last month. | 美国联邦通信委员会曾估计更换中国设备的成本约为20亿美元。上个月披露的最新估计显示约为50亿美元。联邦通信委员会和国会需要时间来弄清楚如何支付小型电信公司报出的所需金额。与此同时，正如《政治人》上个月报道的那样，许多此类供应商甚至还没有开始更换华为和中兴的设备。 |
| There is plenty of finger-pointing over how this happened. Congress imposed a mandate on small companies, and then didn’t follow through with the money. U.S. officials waffled on which types of Huawei and ZTE equipment should be replaced. The delay and muddled official messages slowed down the process. | 在这个过程中有很多相互指责。国会对小公司强加了一项要求，却没有将费用兑现。美国官员对于哪些类型的华为和中兴设备应被更换争论不休。官方信息延迟且混乱，导致过程缓慢。 |
| Naomi Wilson, an Asia policy specialist at ITI, a trade group of U.S. tech and telecommunications companies, told me that the first estimates for replacing the equipment were best guesses that proved far too low. Inflation, supply-chain problems and a trade war between the U.S. and China increased the price. | 美国科技和电信公司贸易组织ITI的亚洲政策专家娜奥米·威尔逊告诉我，更换设备的最初成本估算只是最理想的猜测，但事实证明太低了。通货膨胀、供应链问题和中美之间的贸易战推高了价格。 |
| One big question is whether this drama could have been avoided. I asked Paul Triolo, senior vice president for China at Albright Stonebridge Group, a strategy firm, if the U.S. had a good plan with wobbly execution or if the strategy was misguided to begin with. He said it was a little of both. | 一个重要的问题是，这场纷争原本能否避免。我询问战略公司奥尔布赖特石桥集团中国区高级副总裁保罗·特里奥洛，究竟是美国的计划不错但执行无方，还是说该策略从一开始就误入歧途。他说两者兼有。 |
| Triolo said that the U.S. government could have phased out Huawei and ZTE equipment over many years — similar to Britain’s approach — and fast-tracked removal of some types of Chinese gear or equipment near sensitive locations such as near military facilities. While the U.S. said that it needed to remove the risk of the equipment quickly, all that stuff remains in place anyway, he said. | 特里奥洛表示，美国政府本可以像英国那样，在几年内逐步淘汰华为和中兴的设备，并在军事设施等敏感地点附近加快移除某些类型的中国装置或设备。他说，虽然美国表示这些设备风险需要迅速消除，但这些东西都仍在那里。 |
| Triolo and some other China policy experts that I’ve spoken to are concerned that America’s approaches to Chinese tech aren’t always effective or focused on the right things. | 特里奥洛和其他一些与我交谈过的中国政策专家担心，美国处理中国科技的方法并不总是有效或专注于该做的事情。 |
| The U.S. is also concerned about the potential for TikTok or other apps originating from Chinese companies to siphon sensitive data on Americans or spread Chinese government propaganda. Policymakers haven’t figured out yet how to address those concerns or made much progress on the relentless Chinese cyberattacks on American government agencies and companies. | 美国还担心来自中国公司的TikTok或其他应用程序可能会窃取美国人的敏感数据，或传播中国政府的宣传。政策制定者尚未想出如何解决这些担忧，在中国对美国政府机构和公司的无休止的网络攻击方面也没有取得多少进展。 |
| Officials don’t always have coherent messages about building a homegrown computer chip industry to counter China. And if the U.S. wants to keep American technology strong, it could do more to support the immigration of tech experts or repeal Chinese tariffs that hurt Americans. | 在建立本土计算机芯片产业以对抗中国方面，官员们传达的信息并不总是一致。如果想保持自身技术的强大，美国可以做更多的事情来支持技术专家移民或废除给美国人带来损失的中国关税。 |
| The U.S. could, in theory, do it all. Officials could wall off the country from potential foreign dangers and devote the time, money and smarts necessary to support the best policies for American innovation. Instead, we have bits and parts that don’t yet add up to much. | 理论上，美国可以做到这一切。官员们可以将国家与潜在的外国危险隔离开来，并投入必要的时间、金钱和智慧来支持美国创新的最佳政策。然而我们东一榔头西一棒子的行动并没有得到什么成果。 |
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