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| A major war raging on Russia’s and NATO’s borders. Increasingly bold Western military support. Russian threats of direct retaliation. A mood of siege and desperation in the Kremlin. Growing uncertainty around each side’s red lines. |
| 一场大战在俄罗斯和北约边境愈演愈烈。西方军事支持越来越大胆。俄罗斯威胁进行直接报复。克里姆林宫沉浸在一种受困和绝望的情绪中。围绕双方红线的不确定性不断增加。 |
| As Russia and NATO escalate their standoff over Ukraine, nuclear strategists and former U.S. officials warn that there is a remote but growing risk of an unintended slide into direct conflict — even, in some scenarios, a nuclear exchange. |
| 随着俄罗斯和北约在乌克兰问题上的对峙升级，核战略家和前美国官员警告说，双方无意中陷入直接冲突，甚至在某些情况下发生核冲突的可能性虽然很微小，但这种可能性也在不断增加。 |
| “The prospect of nuclear war,” António Guterres, the United Nations secretary general, warned this week, “is now back within the realm of possibility.” |
| “核战争的前景，”联合国秘书长古特雷斯本周警告说。“现在又回到了可能的范围之内。” |
| Leaders on both sides emphasize that they consider such a war unthinkable, even as they make preparations and issue declarations for how they might carry it out. But the fear, experts stress, is not a deliberate escalation to war, but a misunderstanding or a provocation gone too far that, as each side scrambles to respond, spirals out of control. |
| 双方领导人都强调，他们认为这样的战争是不可想象的，尽管他们已经做好准备，并就在什么情况下才会采取行动发表了声明。但专家们强调，人们担心的不是蓄意升级为战争，而是误解或过火的挑衅，在各方匆忙做出回应时，这样的误解或挑衅会逐渐失控。 |
| The war in Ukraine heightens these risks to a level not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in some ways is potentially more dangerous than that, some experts say. |
| 一些专家表示，乌克兰战争将这样的风险提升到了古巴导弹危机以来的最高水平，在某些方面可能更危险。 |
| NATO forces, intended as defensive, are massing near Russian borders that, with much of Russia’s military bogged down in Ukraine, are unusually vulnerable. Increasingly paranoid Kremlin leaders, faced with economic devastation and domestic unrest, may believe that a Western plot to remove them is already underway. |
| 北约的防御性力量正在俄罗斯边境附近集结，由于俄罗斯的大部分军队正深陷在乌克兰，这些边境地区异常脆弱。面对经济崩溃和国内动荡，越来越多疑的克林姆林宫领导人可能认为，西方已经在密谋推翻他们。 |
| Russia has said that it considers the weapons and other increased military aid that Western governments are sending to Ukraine tantamount to war, and has implied that it might strike NATO convoys. Over the weekend, Russian missiles struck a Ukrainian base mere miles from Polish territory. |
| 俄罗斯表示，该国认为西方政府向乌克兰提供的武器和其他增加的军事援助相当于战争，并暗示可能会打击北约的车队。上周末，俄罗斯导弹袭击了距离波兰领土仅几公里的乌克兰基地。 |
| “Those are the things that make me really concerned about escalation here,” said Ulrich Kühn, a nuclear strategist at the University of Hamburg in Germany. |
| 德国汉堡大学的核战略家乌尔里希·库恩说，“这些事情让我真正担心这里的局势升级。” |
| “The chance for nuclear weapons employment is extremely low. But it’s not zero. It’s real, and it might even increase,” he said. “Those things could happen.” |
| “使用核武器的机会非常低。但不是零。它是真实的，而且可能还会增加，”他说。“这些事情可能会发生。” |
| The Kremlin has turned to nuclear saber-rattling that may not be entirely empty of threat. Russian war planners, obsessed with fears of NATO invasion, have implied in recent policy documents and war games that they may believe that Russia could turn back such a force through a single nuclear strike — a gambit that Soviet-era leaders rejected as unthinkable. |
| 克林姆林宫已经发出了可能并非完全空洞的核武力恫吓。俄罗斯的战争策划者被北约入侵的恐惧困扰着，在最近的政策文件和战棋推演中暗示，他们可能相信俄罗斯可以通过一次核打击来击退这样的力量——苏联时代的领导人认为这样的策略是不可想象的。 |
| The outcome of such a strike would be impossible to predict. A recent Princeton University simulation, projecting out each side’s war plans and other indicators, estimated that it would be likely to trigger a tit-for-tat exchange that, in escalating to strategic weapons like intercontinental missiles, could kill 34 million people within a few hours. |
| 这样一场打击的结果是无法预测的。普林斯顿大学最近的一项模拟预测了双方的战争计划和其他指标，估计最后可能会引发一场针锋相对的交火，如果升级为洲际导弹等战略武器，可能会在几小时内杀死3400万人。 |
| Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s deputy secretary general from 2012 to 2016, said that Western leaders had concluded that Russian plans to use nuclear weapons in a major crisis were sincere, raising the risk from any accident or misstep that the Kremlin mistook for war. |
| 曾在2012年至2016年担任北约副秘书长的亚历山大·弗什鲍表示，西方领导人得出的结论是，俄罗斯在重大危机中使用核武器的计划是认真的，因此，北约的一些事故或失误可能被克里姆林宫误认为战争，这样的风险增加了。 |
| With Russian forces struggling in a Ukraine conflict that Moscow’s leaders have portrayed as existential, Mr. Vershbow added, “That risk has definitely grown in the last two and a half weeks.” |
| 弗什鲍还说，随着俄罗斯军队在被莫斯科领导人描述为生死攸关的乌克兰冲突中苦苦挣扎，“这种风险在过去两周半里肯定有所增加。” |
| Murky Red Lines |
| 模糊的红线 |
| Since at least 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Crimea led to high tension with the West, Moscow has articulated a policy of potentially using nuclear weapons against any threat to “the existence of the state itself.” |
| 至少从2014年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚，导致与西方关系高度紧张开始，莫斯科就明确表示了一项政策，即可能使用核武器来应对一切关乎“国家自身存在”的威胁。 |
| Russian statements have subsequently expanded on this in ways that may make the country’s nuclear tripwires easier to inadvertently cross. |
| 俄罗斯随后的一些声明对此进行了进一步阐释，这可能会使该国的核触发线更有可能在不经意间被越过。 |
| In 2017, Moscow published an ambiguously worded doctrine that said it could, in a major conflict, conduct a “demonstration of readiness and determination to employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons,” which some analysts believe could describe a single nuclear launch. |
| 2017年，莫斯科发布了一项措辞含糊的原则，称在重大冲突中会“展示使用非战略核武器的准备和决心”，一些分析人士认为，这可能是在描述一次核武器发射。 |
| Evgeny Buzhinsky, a retired member of the Russian military’s general staff, has described the aim of such a strike as “to show intention, as a de-escalating factor.” Some versions call for the blast to hit empty territory, others to strike enemy troops. |
| 已退役的俄军总参谋部成员叶夫根尼·布津斯基称，这样一次打击的目的是“显示意图，作为一种降级因素”。有说法是在一片空旷地区引爆，但也有用于打击敌军的版本。 |
| The next year, Vladimir V. Putin, Russia’s president, said that Russia could use nuclear warheads “within seconds” of an attack onto Russian territory — raising fears that a border skirmish or other incident could, if mistaken as something more, set off a nuclear strike. |
| 第二年，俄罗斯总统普京表示，俄罗斯可以在其领土遭到攻击的“几秒钟内”使用核弹头——这引发了人们的担忧，如果边境冲突或其他事件被误认为是更严重的事件，可能会引发核打击。 |
| A 2020 Russian government paper seemed to expand these conditions further, mentioning the use of drones and other equipment as potentially triggering Russia’s nuclear red lines. |
| 一份2020年的俄罗斯政府文件似乎进一步扩展了这些条件，提到无人机和其他设备的使用可能触发俄罗斯的核红线。 |
| These policies are designed to address a problem that Soviet leaders never faced: a belief that, unlike during the Cold War, NATO would quickly and decisively win a conventional war against Russia. |
| 这些政策旨在解决苏联领导人从未面对过的一个问题：现在的俄罗斯领导人相信，与冷战时期不同，在与俄罗斯的常规战争中，北约将迅速而果断地取胜。 |
| The result is a reluctant but seemingly real embrace of limited nuclear conflict as manageable, even winnable. Russia is thought to have stockpiled at least 1,000 small, “nonstrategic” warheads in preparation, as well as hypersonic missiles that would zip them across Europe before the West could respond. |
| 其结果是，他们虽然不情愿，但似乎真正接受了有限的核冲突，认为它是可控的，甚至是可以打赢的。据信，俄罗斯已经储备了至少1000枚小型“非战略”弹头，以及高超音速导弹，可以在西方作出反应之前迅速射向欧洲。 |
| But Russian military strategists continue to debate how to calibrate such a strike so as to force back NATO without triggering a wider war, underscoring concerns that threading such a needle may be impossible — and that Moscow could try anyway. |
| 但俄罗斯军事战略家仍在争论如何调整这样的打击，以便在不引发更大范围战争的情况下迫使北约撤退，这表明他们担心这种事太困难，很难实现——但莫斯科无论如何都会尝试。 |
| Escalation Risks |
| 升级风险 |
| “The escalation dynamics of a conflict between the U.S. and Russia could easily spiral into a nuclear exchange,” said Dmitry Gorenburg, an analyst of Russian military policy. |
| 俄罗斯军事政策分析人士德米特里·戈任伯格说，“美俄冲突的升级态势很可能演变成核战。” |
| Partly this is because, unlike Cold War proxy battles, Ukraine’s war is raging in the heart of Europe, with NATO and Russian forces massed a relatively short drive away from Moscow and several Western capitals. |
| 这在一定程度上是因为，与冷战时期的代理人战争不同，乌克兰战争是在欧洲的心脏地区进行，北约和俄罗斯的军队在距离莫斯科和几个西方国家首都相对较近的地方集结。 |
| Partly it is because of Russia’s lowered nuclear threshold and heightened sense of vulnerability. |
| 部分原因是俄罗斯的核门槛降低了，该国的脆弱感也增强了。 |
| But Moscow also seemingly believes that a sort of NATO-Russia conflict has already begun. |
| 但莫斯科似乎也相信，北约与俄罗斯的冲突在某种程度上已经开始。 |
| Russian strategic doctrine is designed in part around a fear that the West will foment economic and political unrest within Russia as prelude to an invasion. |
| 俄罗斯设计战略理论的部分目的是出于一种担忧，即西方将在俄罗斯国内挑起经济和政治动荡，作为入侵的前奏。 |
| With Mr. Putin now facing economic devastation and rising protests, “A lot of the pieces of their nightmare are already coming together,” said Samuel Charap, who studies Russian foreign policy at the RAND Corporation. |
| 普京如今面临着经济崩溃和越来越多的抗议，“他们噩梦里的很多片段已经开始拼凑起来了，”兰德公司研究俄罗斯外交政策的塞缪尔·查拉普表示。 |
| In these circumstances, Moscow could misconstrue NATO’s troop buildup, or steps of military support for Ukraine, as preparations for just the sort of attack that Russian nuclear policy is designed to meet. |
| 面对此种局势，莫斯科可能曲解北约增兵或对乌克兰军事援助步骤的意图，认为这正是俄罗斯核政策所要应对的攻击的准备工作。 |
| “Between volunteers from NATO countries, all this NATO weaponry, reinforcement of Poland and Romania,” Mr. Charap said, “they might connect dots that we didn’t intend to be connected and decide they need to pre-empt.” |
| “北约国家的志愿军、所有这些北约提供的武器、波兰和罗马尼亚的增援，”查拉普说道，“他们可能会把我们无意连接的线索都串起来，并认定他们需要先发制人。” |
| In such a climate, a few mishaps or miscalculations — say, an errant strike or clumsy provocation by one side that sets off a stronger-than-expected retaliation by the other — could escalate, in only a few steps, to the point of triggering Moscow’s fears of an attack. |
| 在这样的氛围下，稍有意外或误判——譬如一方进行了错误打击或不恰当的挑衅，引发了另一方超出预期的报复行动——都可能迅速引发局势升级，直至令莫斯科担心自己会遭受袭击。 |
| Mr. Putin has already said that direct Western intervention in the Ukraine war might trigger Russian nuclear retaliation. Now, each uptick in Western support for Ukrainian forces tests those limits. |
| 普京已经表态称，西方直接干预乌克兰战争可能招致俄罗斯的核报复。现在，西方对乌克兰军队的支持每多一分，都是在考验俄方忍耐的极限。 |
| “Part of our problem is that I’m not sure we have a clear sense of exactly where the lines are,” Dr. Gorenburg said, adding, “This is why we’re seeing all the hemming and hawing back and forth with the question of providing aircraft. There’s just uncertainty as to how the Russians would take that.” |
| “难题之一就在于，我不确定我们是否清楚界限在哪里，”格伦堡说，并补充称，“这就是为什么在提供飞机的问题上，我们看到了那么多犹豫不决。就是因为不确定俄罗斯人会如何看待此举。” |
| Dr. Kühn, the German analyst, worried that American domestic politics could play a role as well. Should Russia use chemical weapons or commit some other transgression, American leaders could face overwhelming pressure to retaliate beyond what Moscow anticipates. |
| 德国分析人士库恩担心，美国国内政治也可能发挥作用。如果俄罗斯使用化学武器，或是犯下其他战争罪行，美国领导人可能将面临巨大压力，要求其采取超出莫斯科预期的报复措施。 |
| Many in Washington are already calling for a no-fly zone or other direct intervention, arguing that U.S. warheads would deter Moscow from nuclear retaliation. |
| 华盛顿已有许多人在呼吁设立禁飞区或进行其他直接干预，声称美国的弹头能让俄罗斯打消核报复的念头。 |
| But clearing Ukraine’s airspace would likely require striking air bases and anti-air defenses within Russia that also serve to defend Russia’s borders. Analysts caution that such fighting could easily spiral out of control or trigger the Kremlin’s fears of a NATO push to Moscow, leading Mr. Putin to launch a last-resort nuclear strike. |
| 但要在乌克兰领空实施禁飞，很可能需要对俄罗斯境内负责保卫边境的空军基地和防空设施进行打击。分析人士警告称，这样的战斗很容易失控，或引发克里姆林宫对北约向莫斯科推进的担忧，从而导致普京发动核打击作为终极手段。 |
| War Games |
| 战争演练 |
| Christopher S. Chivvis, a former U.S. intelligence official for Europe, recently wrote that “scores of war games carried out by the United States and its allies” all projected that Mr. Putin would launch a single nuclear strike if he faced limited fighting with NATO or major setbacks in Ukraine that he blamed on the West. |
| 美国前欧洲情报官员克里斯托弗·S·奇夫维斯最近写道，“美国及其盟友进行了大量演练，”结果都表明，如果普京面临与北约的有限战斗，或是在乌克兰遭遇重大挫折，而他将此归咎于西方，那么他会发动一次核打击。 |
| The truth is that even Mr. Putin may not know his nuclear red lines for sure. But American fears of Russian nuclear escalation may be dangerous, too. |
| 事实上，可能连普京自己都不清楚他的核战红线到底在哪里。但美国对俄罗斯核升级的担忧可能也会带来危险。 |
| Any nuclear conflict, however initially limited, carries an escalatory risk that strategists call “use it or lose it.” |
| 无论最初规模多么有限，任何一场核冲突都会带来不断升级的危险，战略分析师称之为“要么用，要么输”。 |
| Both sides know that rapid nuclear strikes could wipe out their military forces in Europe, even their entire nuclear arsenals, leaving them defenseless. |
| 双方都明白，快速核打击可能摧毁他们在欧洲的军事力量乃至整个核武库，使他们失去防御能力。 |
| This means that both sides face an incentive to launch widely before the other can do so first — even if leaders believe that the conflict may have begun in error. |
| 这意味着双方都有理由在对方行动之前发动大规模袭击——即使领导人都认为冲突可能是因误会而起。 |
| Recent advances in short-range missile technology means that leaders now have as little as a few minutes to decide whether or not to launch, drastically increasing the pressure to launch quickly, widely and with only partial information from the ground. |
| 短程弹道导弹技术的最新进步意味着，领导人如今可能需要在短短几分钟时间里决定是否发射，使得进行大规模迅速发射的决策压力大大增加，而可供参考的地面信息却是不完整的。 |
| Late in the Obama administration, two American war simulations imagined an accidental skirmish between NATO and Russia that Moscow met with a single nuclear strike. |
| 在奥巴马执政后期，美国进行了两次战争模拟，设想了北约与俄罗斯的一次意外冲突，而莫斯科以单次核打击作为回应。 |
| In the first, Pentagon leaders proposed a retaliatory nuclear strike to signal resolve. But a civilian White House official, Colin H. Kahl, instead persuaded them to stand down and isolate Moscow diplomatically. Mr. Kahl is now an under secretary at the Pentagon. |
| 在第一场模拟中，五角大楼领导人提议进行一次报复性核打击以表明决心。但白宫文职官员科林·H·卡尔却说服他们按兵不动，在外交上孤立莫斯科。卡尔目前是五角大楼的一名副部长。 |
| But the second simulation ended with American nuclear strikes, underscoring that Washington cannot fully anticipate even its own actions in the event of such a crisis. |
| 但第二场模拟以美国发动核打击结束，这表明，如果出现这样的危机，华盛顿对自己的行动都不能完全预测。 |
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