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| As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine grinds on, Moscow is finding itself mired in a parallel conflict: a contest of economic and political endurance against the West. | 随着俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵不断深入，莫斯科发现自己陷入了一场平行冲突：与西方在经济上和政治上展开耐力较量。 |
| Vladimir V. Putin, Russia’s president, had prepared Russia for sanctions like those imposed after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, as if daring Western countries to cut off their citizens from Russian trade and see who blinked first. | 总统普京已经让俄罗斯做好了准备，来应对类似2014年吞并克里米亚后被施加的制裁，仿佛是在挑战西方国家敢不敢切断其公民与俄罗斯的贸易，看谁先屈服。 |
| But the severity of Western measures has far exceeded expectations, not only devastating Russia’s economy but also isolating its citizens from travel and even from Western brands like Apple and McDonald’s. | 但这次西方措施的严厉程度远远超出预期，它不仅破坏了俄罗斯的经济，而且导致其公民无法旅行，甚至无法接触到苹果和麦当劳等西方品牌。 |
| Now, both sides face a test of their ability to maintain domestic support for a standoff whose costs will be borne by regular citizens. More than a battle of wills, it is a test of two opposing systems. | 现在，双方都面临着考验，是否能维持国内对一场成本由普通民众承担的对峙的支持。这不仅仅是一场意志之战，更是对两个对立制度的考验。 |
| Mr. Putin’s Russia, which rallied around nationalist fervor in 2014, now relies on propaganda and repression. Western leaders increasingly appeal to liberal ideals of international norms and collective welfare that had been in global decline — until now, they hope. | 2014年，普京领导的俄罗斯团结在民族主义狂热之中，现在依靠的是宣传和镇压。而西方领导人则越来越多地诉诸国际规范和集体福祉的自由主义理想，这些理想在全球范围内一直在衰落——他们希望这种衰落状况能到此为止。 |
| The economic balance favors the West in the extreme. One study estimated that a full trade war would curb the combined gross domestic product of Western countries by 0.17 percent, but Russia’s by a devastating 9.7 percent. | 经济平衡对西方极为有利。一项研究估计，一场全面的贸易战将使西方国家的国内生产总值总和减少0.17%，但俄罗斯的国内生产总值将减少9.7%，这是毁灭性的数字。 |
| Public opinion may also advantage the West, where surveys find wide support for harsh measures against Russia, whereas Mr. Putin dare not even acknowledge the war’s extent for fear of triggering more protests. | 公众舆论也可能对西方有利，调查显示人们普遍支持对俄罗斯采取严厉措施，而普京甚至不敢承认战争规模，害怕引发更多抗议。 |
| Still, Western leaders must maintain unity across 20-plus fractious democracies, persuading citizens from Canada to Bulgaria that spiking energy prices — which may be just the start of the economic shocks — are worth the sacrifice. | 尽管如此，西方领导人必须使这20多个不听指挥的民主国家保持团结，说服从加拿大到保加利亚的民众，让他们相信为飙升的能源价格（这可能只是经济冲击的开始）所做出的牺牲是值得的。 |
| Political fissures will inevitably open within the West, said Jeremy Shapiro, the research director for the European Council on Foreign Relations. | 欧洲外交关系委员会研究主任杰里米·夏皮罗说，西方内部将不可避免地出现政治裂痕。 |
| “The polls really tell us nothing about how people will actually react to economic pain and masses of refugees,” Mr. Shapiro said. The question is when. | “我们无法从民意调查中得知人们面对经济困难和大量难民的实际反应，”夏皮罗说。问题是什么时候。 |
| Mr. Putin, meanwhile, must maintain his grip on both Russia’s public and the network of political power brokers who back him. If their tolerance of the war’s rapidly rising toll slips before Western resolve does, it could imperil not just his war, but his very hold on power. | 与此同时，普京必须同时对俄罗斯公众和支持他的政治权力掮客网络保持控制。他们要忍受战争中迅速上升的死亡人数，如果这一容忍度先于西方的决心而下滑，那不仅可能危及他的战争，而且可能危及他对权力的掌控。 |
| The question of who breaks first may shape Ukraine’s fate as much as any weapons transfer or tank assault. And though the outcome is impossible to predict, a range of economic indicators and political signals offer some clues. | 谁先撑不住的问题可能会影响乌克兰的命运，这不亚于任何武器转让或坦克攻击。尽管结果无法预测，但一系列经济指标和政治信号提供了蛛丝马迹。 |
| The West’s Challenge | 西方的挑战 |
| Western countries’ secret weapon, nearly as important as their economic edge, may be their citizens’ sudden desire for concerted and unified action. | 西方国家的秘密武器可能是其公民突然想要采取协调一致的行动，这几乎与其经济优势一样重要。 |
| In polls, Europeans across the continent express a moral imperative to punish Russia’s invasion, as well as a belief that Russia now poses a direct threat to their countries. | 在民调中，整个欧洲大陆的人都表达了惩罚俄罗斯入侵的道德义务，而且认为俄罗斯现在对他们的国家构成直接威胁。 |
| In a seven-country survey taken just before the invasion, a plurality said they were willing to personally bear the economic toll of isolating Russia, which provides much of Europe’s energy. Country-specific polls suggest that share has likely increased. | 在入侵之前对七个国家进行的一项调查中，多数人表示他们愿意个人承担孤立俄罗斯导致的经济损失——俄罗斯提供了欧洲的大部分能源。各国的民意调查显示，这一比例可能有所增加。 |
| In Germany — the European Union’s largest economy and often its decider on Russia matters — only 38 percent supported increasing military spending as of September, now it is up to 69 percent. | 德国是欧盟最大的经济体，而且往往是欧盟在俄罗斯问题上的决策者。截至9月，德国只有38%的人支持增加军费开支，现在这一比例高达69%。 |
| In past standoffs, European leaders often went against the will of their voters to confront Moscow, seeing it as a grim necessity. | 在过去的对峙中，欧洲领导人经常违背选民的意愿来对抗莫斯科，认为这是一种严峻的需要。 |
| Now, leaders like Olaf Scholz of Germany and Emmanuel Macron of France are seeing their approval ratings surge as they rally against Russia. Far from playing down the costs to everyday citizens, some emphasize it as a point of pride. | 现在，像德国的朔尔茨和法国的马克龙这样的领导人在反对俄罗斯的同时，看到自己的支持率飙升。一些人并没有淡化普通公民要付出的代价，而强调这是引人为傲的事情。 |
| Political risks are further eased by the election calendar: Mr. Macron is nearly alone among Western leaders in facing re-election this year and is a strong favorite to win. | 选举日程进一步缓解了政治风险：在西方领导人中，马克龙几乎是唯一一位今年面临连任的领导人，并且很有希望赢得选举。 |
| Still, a slowdown in Russian energy exports — already underway as Russian firms are buffeted by the turmoil — is expected to hit Europe hard. Germany imports more than half of its gas from Russia, as does Austria. Some Eastern European countries run on nearly 100 percent Russian gas. | 尽管如此，随着俄企受到动荡的冲击，俄罗斯能源出口已经开始放缓，预计将对欧洲造成沉重打击。德国一半以上的天然气从俄罗斯进口，奥地利也是如此。一些东欧国家几乎100%使用俄罗斯天然气。 |
| Europe’s West gets most of its gas elsewhere, such as from Norway and Algeria. Still, as Russia is cut off from buyers, fossil fuels will become scarcer and therefore costlier worldwide. Some Germans’ energy bills are already projected to increase by two-thirds this year. | 欧洲西部的大部分天然气来自其他地方，例如挪威和阿尔及利亚。尽管如此，随着俄罗斯与买家的联系被切断，化石燃料将在全球范围内变得更加稀缺，因此价格会更高。一些德国人的能源账单预计今年将增加三分之二。 |
| To ease the burden, European governments are putting in place sweeping energy subsidies, worth 15.5 billion euros, or about $17 billion, in France, €5.5 billion in Italy, €2 billion in Poland, €1.7 billion in Austria, and so on. Many target low-income households. | 为了减轻负担，欧洲各国政府正在实施大规模的能源补贴，法国拿出155亿欧元（约合170亿美元）、意大利55亿欧元、波兰20亿欧元、奥地利17亿欧元，等等。许多补贴针对低收入家庭。 |
| But there may be a timer on Western resilience. Unless European countries radically re-engineer their infrastructure for importing gas or take on perhaps the fastest shift to renewable energy in history — both considered technically feasible but costly — they could potentially run out of fuel next winter. | 但西方的适应力可能并不长久。除非欧洲国家从根本上重新设计其进口天然气的基础设施，或者采取可能是历史上最快的可再生能源转变——这两种方式在技术上可行但成本高昂——否则它们可能会在明年冬天耗尽燃料。 |
| Economic shocks could extend well beyond heating costs. A number of European industries are already slowing production because of rising energy prices. Russia also exports much of the world’s copper and other industrial materials. | 经济冲击可能远远超出供暖成本。由于能源价格上涨，许多欧洲行业已经在放缓生产。俄罗斯还出口世界上大部分的铜和其他工业材料。 |
| At the same time, while Europeans express wide support for welcoming Ukrainian refugees, it is unclear whether this will last. | 与此同时，虽然欧洲人对欢迎乌克兰难民表达了广泛支持，但尚不清楚这种态度是否会持续。 |
| Europe is already expecting a major surge in refugee arrivals this summer, many from Afghanistan. Western leaders have proved extremely sensitive to anti-immigration backlash. | 欧洲已经预计今年夏天抵达的难民人数将大幅增加，其中许多来自阿富汗。事实证明，西方领导人对反移民的强烈反应极为敏感。 |
| “There remain significant divides that are being buried in the emotion of the moment,” Mr. Shapiro said. | “在当下的情绪中，仍然隐藏着巨大的分歧，”夏皮罗说。 |
| The West’s greatest ally in maintaining unity may be Mr. Putin himself. By massing forces on NATO’s borders and producing shocking images of destruction in Ukraine, he has given Europeans something to rally against, distracting from their disagreements, for now. | 西方维护团结的最大盟友可能是普京本人。通过在北约边界集结部队并在乌克兰制造令人震惊的破坏画面，他暂时为欧洲人提供了一些可以团结起来反对的东西，从而分散了他们对分歧的关注。 |
| Moscow’s Challenge | 莫斯科的挑战 |
| In a telling contrast to 2014, when many Russians cheered their country’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Putin has turned almost immediately to repression and censorship, threatening severe prison terms for so much as calling the invasion a “war.” | 2014年，许多俄罗斯人都在为自己的国家入侵乌克兰而欢呼，与其形成鲜明对比的是，如今，普京几乎立刻就转向了镇压和审查，甚至威胁要将这次入侵称为“战争”的人处以严厉刑罚。 |
| This has accelerated a kind of authoritarian feedback loop in Russia, with tightening repression feeding popular discontent, beyond even the extremes of recent years. | 这在俄罗斯加速了一种威权主义的反馈循环，不断加强的镇压加剧了民众的不满，甚至超出了近年来的极端程度。 |
| But Mr. Putin belongs to a particular club of authoritarians — individual strongmen, rather than military or party dictatorships — for whom popular support is a secondary concern. | 但普京属于一个特殊的威权者群体——个体的强人，而不是军事或政党独裁——对这种人来说，民众的支持是次要的。 |
| Rather, such leaders draw their power from the backing of political elites, like the heads of security agencies or state industries, said Erica Frantz, a Michigan State University scholar of authoritarianism. | 密歇根州立大学研究威权主义的学者埃里卡·弗朗茨说，相反，这些领导人的权力来自安全机构或国有企业负责人等政治精英的支持。 |
| “This is not to say that ordinary citizens don’t matter, but rather that if we’re looking for regime vulnerabilities at the moment, the focal point really needs to be on these indicators of elite discontent,” Dr. Frantz said. | “这不是说普通公民不重要，而是说，如果我们现在要寻找这个政权的弱点，确实需要把重点放在反映这些精英不满情绪的指标上，”弗朗茨说。 |
| Authoritarian elites, garrisoned behind vast personal wealth, can more easily endure the economic hardship that will be borne by regular Russians. They also tend to give leaders wide latitude in wartime, which may be why strongmen rarely lose power because of battlefield losses, research has shown. | 拥有巨额私人财富的威权精英们更容易忍受普通俄罗斯人即将承受的经济困难。研究显示，在战争期间，他们也倾向于给予领导人更大自由度，可能正因如此，强人统治者很少因为战场上的损失而失去权力。 |
| Still, such elites are not fooled by state propaganda. And they are not indifferent to their country’s fate. | 不过，这些精英不会被国家的宣传所愚弄。他们对自己国家的命运也并非漠不关心。 |
| Surveys of Russian political elites conducted in 2020 found that most backed Mr. Putin for exactly the accomplishments now under threat: stabilizing the country and winning it respect abroad. Many also expressed concern over his handling of the economy — and opposition to military adventurism in Ukraine. | 2020年对俄罗斯政治精英进行的调查发现，大多数人支持普京是因为他令国家稳定下来，并为其赢得外国的尊重，然而这些成就现在正面临威胁。许多人还对他处理经济的方式表示担忧，并反对在乌克兰的军事冒险主义。 |
| “The crisis will be most severe for a minimum of three years. Take the 1998 crisis and multiply it by three,” Oleg Deripaska, a prominent Russian billionaire, said in an unusual break with the Kremlin, referring to Russia’s economically catastrophic 1990s. | “这场危机将在至少三年内最为严重。相当于1998年的危机乘以三，”俄罗斯著名亿万富翁奥列格·德里帕斯卡说。他与克里姆林宫不同寻常地决裂了，他所说的危机是指俄罗斯在上世纪90年代经历的经济灾难。 |
| Sanctions could hurt Mr. Putin with the elite by limiting his ability to distribute the spoils they expect in return for their support. So could popular unrest, if it grows severe enough to make those elites question whether Mr. Putin is imperiling Russia’s stability. | 制裁可能会影响普京在精英阶层心目中的地位，因为它限制了普京为了换取他们的支持对利益进行分配的能力。民众骚乱也是如此，如果它变得非常严重，也会让那些精英人士质疑普京是否在危及俄罗斯的稳定。 |
| “Russian public opinion is becoming such a problem that Putin is effectively fighting two wars: one in Ukraine, and one at home,” Sam Greene, a Russia scholar at King’s College London, wrote this week. | “俄罗斯公众舆论正成为一个大问题，普京实际上正在打两场战争：一场在乌克兰，一场在国内，”伦敦国王学院的俄罗斯问题学者萨姆·格林本周写道。 |
| The danger is not only antiwar protests, which have been mostly associated with segments of society already skeptical of Mr. Putin. Bank runs or other forms of mass economic panic, Mr. Greene argued, could trigger a sense of national crisis, overriding even the sanguine lies of state media. | 危险不仅在于反战抗议，这些抗议大多同已对普京持怀疑态度的社会阶层有关。格林认为，银行挤兑或其他形式的大规模经济恐慌可能会引发国家危机感，甚至会压倒官方媒体的乐观谎言。 |
| Mr. Putin, by hiding the scale and nature of the invasion, is in effect tying his own hands, making it impossible for his government to adequately inform citizens about the struggles ahead. You can’t ask citizens to rally around a war you insist does not exist. | 普京隐瞒了入侵的规模和性质，实际上是在自缚手脚，让他的政府无法向公民充分告知未来的斗争。你不能要求公民团结在一场你坚称不存在的战争周围。 |
| Much as European disunity is all but inevitable as the tolls mount, apprehension among the Russian elite may simply be a matter of time. | 随着代价的增加，欧洲的不团结几乎是不可避免的，但俄罗斯精英阶层产生焦虑可能只是时间问题。 |
| “The indicators of elite discontent that we have seen thus far are unusual in Putin’s Russia and should therefore be taken seriously,” Dr. Frantz said, referring to comments by Mr. Deripaska and a few others. | “到目前为止，我们看到的精英阶层不满的迹象在普京统治下的俄罗斯是不寻常的，因此应该认真对待，”弗朗茨说。他指的是德里帕斯卡和其他一些人的言论。 |
| Though she stressed that Mr. Putin could well ride out the self-made crisis, “in the long term, this external pressure — coupled with the domestic unrest — could lead to Putin’s downfall.” | 尽管她强调普京可以很好地度过这场自己制造的危机，“从长远来看，这种外部压力——加上国内动荡——可能会导致普京下台。” |
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