| 双语新闻 Bilingual News | 双语对照阅读 分级系列阅读 智能辅助阅读 在线英语学习 |
|
| 双语新闻 Bilingual News | 双语对照阅读 分级系列阅读 智能辅助阅读 在线英语学习 |
| [英文] [中文] [双语对照] [双语交替] [] |
| As their standoff over Ukraine continues, Moscow and Washington are playing an increasingly high-stakes, increasingly complex game of signaling to try to secure their aims without firing a shot. | 随着围绕乌克兰问题的僵局继续，莫斯科和华盛顿正在玩一场风险越来越大、越来越复杂的信号游戏，试图在不开一枪的情况下实现自己的目的。 |
| Traditional diplomacy is just one component of this dance. Troop movements, sanctions warnings and legislation, embassy closures, leader summits, and intelligence leaks are all aimed, in part, at proving each country’s willingness to carry out certain threats or accept certain risks. | 传统外交只是这场周旋的一个组成部分。军队调动、制裁警告和立法、关闭大使馆、领导人峰会和情报泄露，在一定程度上都是为了证明每个国家愿意实施某些威胁或接受某些风险。 |
| It is a form of high-stakes negotiation, conducted in actions as much as words, meant to settle the future of Europe just as conclusively as if decided by war, by telegraphing how a conflict would play out rather than waging it directly. | 这是一种高风险的谈判形式，通过行动和语言来进行，旨在预告冲突如何发展而不是直接发动战争，以此决定欧洲的未来，并且让这种方式和发动战争具有同样的决定性。 |
| Russia, by shifting thousands of troops from its far east to Ukraine’s border, hopes to convince Washington and Kyiv that it is willing to endure a major war to secure its demands by force, so those countries are better off meeting Russian demands peacefully. | 俄罗斯将数万士兵从远东转移到乌克兰边境，希望说服华盛顿和基辅相信，它愿意承受一场大规模战争，以武力达到自己的目的，因此这些国家最好以和平手段满足它的要求。 |
| The Biden administration, by stating that a Russian invasion may be imminent, even closing its embassy in Kyiv, and vowing economic retaliation, signals that Moscow cannot expect desperate American concessions, making further escalation less worthwhile. | 拜登政府表示，俄罗斯入侵可能迫在眉睫，甚至关闭了驻基辅的大使馆，并誓言进行经济报复，这表明莫斯科不能指望美国做出绝望的让步，从而降低了进一步升级其行动的价值。 |
| There have been a flurry of such gestures. Russia held Black Sea naval exercises, implying it could close off trade waters. President Biden issued joint statements with European leaders, conveying that they are not balking at American sanctions threats that would harm Europe, too. | 双方都作出了一系列这样的姿态。俄罗斯在黑海举行了海军演习，暗示它可以封锁贸易航线。拜登总统与欧洲领导人发表了联合声明，表示它们对于美国采取制裁措施毫不畏缩，这样的制裁可能同样损害欧洲利益。 |
| But the more both sides try to make their threats credible, for example by relocating troops, the more they heighten the risk of a miscalculation that could careen out of control. | 但是，双方越是试图让自己的威胁变得可信（例如重新部署军队），就越会加大误判的风险，导致局势失控。 |
| Each side also cultivates ambiguity about what it will or will not accept, and will or will not do, in hopes of forcing its adversary to prepare for all eventualities, spreading its energies thin. | 对于自己能否接受的东西，以及自己是否会做的事情，双方都在进行模糊处理，希望迫使对手为所有可能性做好准备，从而分散精力。 |
| The White House has said that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia could decide this week whether to invade, deflating Moscow’s careful murkiness, while also demonstrating, especially to cautious Europeans, that any invasion would be driven by Russia, rather than in response to some outside provocation. | 白宫表示，俄罗斯总统普京可能在本周决定是否入侵，这挑破了莫斯科谨慎的模糊态度，同时也表明（特别是向谨慎的欧洲人），任何入侵都将由俄罗斯推动，而不是为了回应外界的挑衅。 |
| On Tuesday, Moscow moved to recreate confusion, withdrawing a handful of forces even as it continued nearby war games and as Mr. Putin accused Ukraine of genocide against its native Russophone minority. By feinting simultaneously toward de-escalation and invasion on Tuesday, Moscow builds pressure on the West to prepare for both. | 周二，莫斯科采取行动重新制造混乱，撤出了少数部队，与此同时，俄罗斯还在附近继续进行军事演习，普京也还在指责乌克兰对本国的俄罗斯少数族裔实行种族灭绝。莫斯科在这一天一方面佯装缓和紧张局势，另一方面又佯装入侵，这是在向西方施压，使其为这两种情况都做好准备。 |
| “This dynamic is very volatile,” said Keren Yarhi-Milo, a Columbia University political scientist who studies how countries signal and maneuver amid crises. | 哥伦比亚大学政治学家凯伦·雅希-米洛说，“形势非常不稳定。” |
| A range of factors particular to this crisis, she added — differing political cultures, multiple audiences, rising uncertainty — “makes the signaling in this case very, very difficult.” | 她还说，这场危机的一系列特殊因素——不同的政治文化、不同的受众、不断加剧的不确定性——“使得在这种情况下发出信号非常、非常困难。” |
| The result is a diplomatic cacophony nearly as difficult to navigate as war itself, with stakes just as high. | 其结果是外交中的喧嚣几乎和战争本身一样难以驾驭，风险也同样高。 |
| Persuasion Games | 说服游戏 |
| With their positioning, Moscow and Washington are struggling to resolve two outstanding questions about a possible conflict, each to their benefit. | 根据各自的立场，莫斯科和华盛顿正在努力解决两个关于可能发生冲突的悬而未决的问题，以便最终结果对自己有利。 |
| Would a Russian invasion bring Moscow more reward than downside? | 俄罗斯入侵对莫斯科会是利大于弊吗？ |
| And, would the West have less tolerance than Russia for the pain of Mr. Biden’s proposed sanctions, and abandon them? | 以及，西方是否会比俄罗斯更加难以承受拜登提议的制裁所带来的痛苦，而因此放弃这些制裁？ |
| If Moscow can convince Washington that the answer to both is “yes,” then Mr. Biden and his allies would, in theory, be forced to conclude that they are better off delivering whatever concessions will keep Russia from launching a war. | 如果莫斯科能够让华盛顿相信这两个问题的答案都是“是”，那么理论上来说，拜登和他的盟友将被迫得出结论，任何能够阻止俄罗斯发动战争的让步都是更好的选择。 |
| But if Washington can persuade Moscow that both answers are “no,” then Mr. Putin will have every incentive to cut his losses and step back from the brink. | 但如果华盛顿能够让莫斯科相信这两个答案都是“不”，那么普京将有充分的动力减少损失并从战争的边缘后退。 |
| Mr. Putin has been ambiguous about what he would consider a successful invasion of Ukraine. And moves like his recent visit to China or his ambassadors’ bluster, shrugging off sanctions, signal that he is ready and able to bear the foreseeable costs. | 对于普京来说，怎样算是成功入侵乌克兰，他一直模棱两可。而像他最近访问中国或他的大使们叫嚣对制裁不屑一顾等行动表明，他已经准备好并能够承担可预见的代价。 |
| Of course, if war were really so advantageous, it could have already begun, one of many hints that Mr. Putin may be partly bluffing, although by how much is impossible to say. | 当然，如果真有优势，可能已经开战了，这也在一定程度上表明普京在虚张声势，尽管夸大到什么程度不好说。 |
| Mr. Biden, for his part, has sent weapons to Ukraine, a message that he would make any conflict more painful for Russia, and has laid out retaliatory sanctions in detail. He has implied Western unity over sanctions that may be just as much a bluff as Mr. Putin’s war talk. | 就拜登而言，他已向乌克兰送出了武器——这表明一旦有冲突，他会让俄罗斯更痛苦——并详细列出了报复性制裁措施。他暗示西方在制裁问题上团结一致，这可能与普京的战争言论一样是虚张声势。 |
| His administration has also publicized what it says are Russian plans to fake a justification for war, implying that any such ploy would be quickly unmasked, making it less attractive. | 他的政府还公布了它所说的俄罗斯为战争伪造理由的计划，暗示任何此类策略都将很快被揭露，不再具有吸引力。 |
| But threats and bluffs work best when they are backed up by action, increasing the risk of a war that neither side may truly want. | 但威胁和虚张声势在有行动支持时效果最好，增加了战争的风险，这样的战争可能是双方实际上都不想要的。 |
| And these efforts are complicated by each side’s need to persuade multiple audiences of contradictory things. | 由于双方都需要说服多方受众接受相互矛盾的事情，这些努力变得十分复杂。 |
| Mr. Biden must persuade Mr. Putin that Western sanctions would be automatic and severe, while also convincing Europeans, who would bear much of the cost, that sanctions would not hit them too hard or be carried out without their consent. | 拜登必须说服普京，西方制裁将是必然且严厉的，同时还要说服将承担大部分成本的欧洲人，制裁不会对他们造成太大的打击，也不会在未经他们同意的情况下实施。 |
| Similarly, Mr. Putin is seeking to position himself to Western leaders as ready for war, while convincing war-averse Russian citizens that he is being dragged into one, for example with false claims of American and Ukrainian aggression. | 同样，普京试图让西方领导人看到自己已做好战争的准备，同时让厌恶战争的俄罗斯公民相信他是被迫卷入战争的，例如发布美国和乌克兰侵犯的虚假声明。 |
| But Western leaders often struggle to differentiate which statements Mr. Putin intends them to take seriously and which he expects them to ignore as bluster for domestic consumption, Christopher Bort, a former U.S. intelligence official, warned in an essay for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. | 但是，美国前情报官员克里斯托弗·博尔特在为卡内基国际和平基金会撰写的一篇文章中警告说，西方领导人常常难以分辨哪些是普京希望他们认真对待的言论，哪些是他针对国内受众的虚张声势并希望西方忽略的言论。 |
| The Kremlin’s “torrent of falsehoods” over Ukraine, Mr. Bort added, risks persuading Western leaders that Moscow’s diplomatic entrees can be ignored as cover for an invasion it has already decided to launch — potentially foreclosing an offramp from war. | 博尔特还说，克里姆林宫在乌克兰问题上的“谎言洪流”有可能让西方领导人以为，莫斯科已经决定发动入侵，而其外交大戏只是掩护，可以忽略不计——可能会因此断了避免战争的念想。 |
| Lost in Translation | 转译中的失真 |
| “Your system is much more open than ours,” said Alexander Gabuev, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “That produces a lot of misunderstanding.” | “一方的系统比另一方的系统开放得多，”卡内基莫斯科中心的高级研究员亚历山大·加布耶夫说。“这会产生很多误解。” |
| Because Kremlin decision-making is dominated by a handful of intelligence and military officials, Mr. Gabuev said, there is a tendency to assume that Washington operates the same way. | 加布耶夫说，由于克里姆林宫的决策由少数情报和军事官员主导，因此人们倾向于假设华盛顿采用同样的运作方式。 |
| Offhand comments by American military officers are given special weight in Moscow, while lawmakers who drive much of Washington’s politics are ignored. | 美国军官的随意评论在莫斯科受到特别的重视，而推动华盛顿大部分政治活动的立法者则被忽视。 |
| Such cultural misunderstandings, Mr. Gabuev added, have become considerably worse in recent years, as Washington and Moscow have expelled one another’s diplomats and ended many unofficial exchanges, hampering their visibility into one another’s politics. | 加布耶夫还说，这种文化误解近年来变得相当严重，因为华盛顿和莫斯科已经驱逐了彼此的外交官并结束了许多非官方的交流，从而妨碍了他们对彼此政治的了解。 |
| This is not always dangerous. Many in Moscow, assuming that Mr. Biden operates like Mr. Putin, believe that Washington has ginned up the appearance of conflict with the intention of declaring a false American victory when the more reasonable Mr. Putin rolls back the deployments he has insisted are defensive, Mr. Gabuev said. | 这并不总是会造成危险。加布耶夫说，莫斯科的许多人认为，拜登像普京一样行事，他们认为，当更加理性的普京撤回他坚称属防御性质的军队部署时，华盛顿制造了冲突的表象，目的是宣布美国取得虚假的胜利。 |
| That misunderstanding significantly eases Mr. Putin’s option to withdraw. And many in Russia view the West as the aggressor, and so would take an averted conflict as Mr. Putin triumphing, not surrendering. | 有了这样的误解，普京要做出后撤的决定就方便了很多。许多俄罗斯人认为是西方来犯，因此普京如果能避免冲突，那将是一种胜利而不是投降。 |
| Still, the less Washington and Moscow understand one another, the harder it will be for them to decipher each other’s signals and anticipate each other’s reactions. | 不过，华盛顿和莫斯科对彼此的理解越少，就越难解读彼此的信号，并预判彼此的反应。 |
| “The Russian president’s circle of trust has consolidated over time, insulating him from information that does not fit with his prior beliefs,” the scholars Adam E. Casey and Seva Gunitsky wrote in Foreign Affairs. | “俄罗斯总统身边有一个稳固的亲信圈子，那些与他既有观念不符的信息是不会抵达他那里的，”学者亚当·E·凯西和塞瓦·古尼茨基在《外交》上写道。 |
| As Mr. Putin’s inner circle has shrunk, they wrote, it has grown dominated by yes-men who tell him what they think he wants to hear and by security service leaders who tend to be hawkish and distrustful toward the West. | 他们说，随着普京的核心圈子逐渐缩小，那些唯命是从的人已经占绝对优势，他们觉得他想听到什么，就说跟他说什么，此外就是往往偏鹰派、对西方充满戒备的军方领导人。 |
| He would hardly be alone in this: research finds that strongmen leaders like him are, for just this reason, likelier to start wars and likelier to lose them. | 他这样的情况并非绝无仅有：研究显示，恰恰是因为这个原因，像他这样的强人领袖会更倾向于发起战争，也更容易输掉战争。 |
| So what Washington takes as Russian brinksmanship or bluffing, for example shrugging off sanctions threats or implying that some Ukrainians would welcome Russian liberators, may reflect sincere belief due to political dysfunction. | 因此，由于政治上的机能障碍，在华盛顿看来俄罗斯是在玩边缘政策或虚张声势的举动——例如对制裁威胁表达不屑，或表示部分乌克兰人会欢迎俄罗斯来解放他们——可能反映的却是真实的想法。 |
| “Information flows to Putin are choppy at best, and sanctions are a highly technical topic that aren’t even well understood in Washington,” said Eddie Fishman, a top sanctions policy official in the Obama administration. | “流向普京的信息至少是断断续续的，制裁是一个极其技术化的话题，即便华盛顿对它的理解也有限，”曾在奥巴马政府中任最高制裁政策官员的埃迪·费舍曼说。 |
| So far, both sides have avoided any obvious misreadings of each other. This may stem in part from the length of the crisis, which has allowed each capital to repeatedly telegraph its intentions and capabilities. | 到目前为止，双方都避免了对对方的明显误读。这在一定程度上可能跟危机持续时间很长有关，双方能反复就其意图和能力做出表示。 |
| But that same factor — time — also creates more opportunities for a mistake as each side escalates. | 但同样是时间这个因素，也在增加双方升级误判的可能性。 |
| “Every day that we’re not resolving it, we are increasing the percentage chance that something will go wrong,” said Dr. Yarhi-Milo, the international relations scholar. | “问题得不到解决，擦枪走火的几率每一天都在上升，”国际关系学者雅希-米洛说。 |
| “We’re testing the nerves of a lot of people at the same time,” she added. “It can take a really bad turn very quickly.” | “我们在同时考验许多人的神经，”她说。“事态有可能转眼间就严重恶化。” |
OK阅读网 版权所有(C)2017 | 联系我们