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| The world woke up on Monday to revelations of a sort that have become disconcertingly routine. | 全世界本周一意识到一种已司空见惯到令人不安的事情。 |
| Chinese hackers had breached governments and universities in a yearslong campaign to steal scientific research, according to a U.S. Justice Department indictment. | 据美国司法部的一份起诉书，中国黑客为窃取科学研究成果进行了长达数年的侵入政府和大学网络的活动。 |
| Separately, several governments, including the Biden administration, accused Beijing of hiring criminal hackers to infiltrate the world’s largest companies and governments for profit. | 包括拜登政府在内的几个国家的政府分别指责北京雇佣黑客犯罪分子，为获取利润渗透了全球最大的公司和政府的计算机系统。 |
| Only hours before, a consortium of news agencies reported that governments worldwide have used spyware sold by an Israeli company to monitor journalists, rights workers, opposition politicians and foreign heads of state. | 就在公布这些指控的几小时前，一个新闻机构的联合体报称，世界各地的政府使用一家以色列公司出售的间谍软件来监控记者、维权工作者、反对派政治人士和外国国家元首。 |
| The rush of allegations represent what cybersecurity and foreign policy experts say is a new normal of continuous, government-linked hacking that may now be a permanent feature of the global order. | 这些一连串的指控代表着网络安全和外交政策专家所说的与政府有关的持续黑客攻击的新常态，可能成为全球秩序的一个永久特征。 |
| Governments have become cannier at exploiting the connectivity of the digital era to advance their interests and weaken their enemies. So have freelance hackers who often sell their services to states, blurring the line between international cyberconflict and everyday crime. | 各国政府在利用数字时代的互联性来推进自身利益、削弱对手方面已变得更加精明。从事自由职业的黑客也是如此，他们往往把自己的服务出售给国家，模糊了国际网络冲突与日常犯罪之间的界限。 |
| Hacking has become a widely used tool of statecraft, oppression and raw economic gain. It is cheap, powerful, easy to outsource and difficult to trace. Anyone with a computer or smartphone is vulnerable. | 黑客攻击已成为一种被广泛使用的治国、镇压和不公正地获取经济利益的工具。这种工具便宜，功能强大，容易外包，但难以追踪。所有使用计算机或智能手机的人都易受攻击。 |
| And hacking bears a trait common to the most destabilizing weapons in history, from medieval siege devices to nuclear arms: It is far more effective for offensive than defensive use. | 黑客攻击与历史上最具破坏性的武器（从中世纪的围城装置到当代的核武器）有一个共同特点：用于攻击比用于防御更有效。 |
| Still, after a decade in which military planners worried that cyberconflict might lead to the real thing, the emerging dangers of this new era are somewhat different than once imagined. | 十年来，军事规划者担心网络冲突可能导致真正的冲突，然而，这个新时代正在出现的危险与曾经想象的有些不同。 |
| Rather than resembling a new kind of war, hacking is coming to play a role in the 21st century much like espionage did in the 20th, analysts and former officials believe. It is a never-ending cat-and-mouse game played by small states and great powers alike. Adversarial, even hostile, but tolerated within limits. Sometimes punished or prevented, but assumed to be constant. | 分析师和前官员认为，黑客攻击并不像一种新的战争，而是在21世纪发挥着20世纪间谍活动那样的作用。这是一种无休止的猫捉老鼠游戏，小国和大国都在参与。它是对抗的、甚至敌对的，但在一定限度内被容忍。它有时会受到惩罚或被阻止，但被认为是持续的。 |
| But there is one important difference, experts say. The tools of espionage are mostly wielded by governments against other governments. The almost democratic nature of hacking — cheaper than setting up an intelligence agency — means that private individuals can get involved too, further muddying the digital waters. And, because it easily scales, almost no target is too small, leaving virtually anyone exposed. | 但专家说，有一个重要区别。间谍活动的工具大多由政府用来对付其他政府。黑客活动比建立情报机构的成本低，有一种近乎民主的本质，这意味着个人也可以参与进来，在数字领域起到了进一步搅浑水的作用。而且，因为黑客活动很容易改变规模，所以几乎没有不够大的目标，这让几乎所有人都面临危险。 |
| Competition Within Bounds | 在允许范围内竞争 |
| Since the first international cyberattacks in the 1990s, policymakers have worried that one government might go too far in targeting another’s systems, risking an escalation to war. | 自20世纪90年代首次发生国际网络攻击以来，政策制定者们一直担心，一个政府在针对另一个政府的网络系统时可能会冒险走得太远，可能升级到战争。 |
| By 2010, Washington had institutionalized its view of cyberspace as a “war-fighting domain,” alongside land, sea, air and space, to be dominated by a new military outfit called Cyber Command. Hacking was seen as a new kind of warfare to be deterred and, if necessary, won. | 到2010年时，华盛顿已将网络空间视为与陆海空以及太空并列的“作战领域”，并将这种观念制度化，成立了一个名为“网络司令部”(Cyber Command)的新军事机构主导网络空间的斗争。黑客活动被视为一种新型战争，要阻止其发生，如果有必要的话，还需要赢得胜利。 |
| But many attacks have been more spycraft than warfare. | 但许多黑客攻击与其说是战争，不如说是间谍活动。 |
| China’s operators nabbed commercial and military patents. Russia’s broke into U.S. government emails and, later, released some to achieve a political impact. The Americans monitored foreign officials and slipped viruses into hostile governments’ systems. | 中国的操作者获得了商业和军事专利。俄罗斯人攻进了美国政府的电子邮件系统，后来还公开了一些邮件，产生政治影响。美国人对外国官员进行监视，还将病毒植入敌对政府的系统。 |
| Governments began treating foreign hackers more like foreign spies. They would disrupt a plot, indict or sanction the individuals directly responsible and chastise or punish the government behind it. | 各国政府开始像对待外国间谍一样对待外国黑客。它们会挫败阴谋，起诉或制裁直接责任人，指责或惩罚幕后的政府。 |
| In 2015, after a series of such episodes, Washington reached an agreement with Beijing to limit hacking. Chinese attacks on American targets dropped immediately, some cybersecurity groups concluded. They spiked again in 2018 amid a rise in tensions under President Donald J. Trump, hinting at a new norm in which digital assaultsrise and fall with diplomatic relations. | 2015年，发生了一系列这类事件后，华盛顿与北京达成了限制黑客活动的协议。一些网络安全团体得出结论说，中国对美国目标的攻击马上减少了。2018年，在唐纳德·J·特朗普(Donald J. Trump)总统领导下，两国的紧张关系升级，黑客攻击再次迅速增长，暗示了一种新常态的出现：数字攻击随外交关系的起落而变。 |
| Though governments largely abandoned military-style deterrence, they have come to punish especially severe attacks. North Korea suffered countrywide internet outages shortly after President Barack Obama said Washington would retaliate for North Korean hacking. He considered similar options against Russia for its attacks during the 2016 elections. | 尽管各国政府在很大程度上放弃了军事形式的威慑，但它们已开始对特别严重的黑客攻击进行惩罚。美国总统贝拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)表示华盛顿将对朝鲜的黑客行为进行报复后不久，朝鲜发生了全国范围的互联网中断。针对俄罗斯在美国2016年大选期间的黑客攻击，奥巴马曾考虑过以俄罗斯为目标的类似选择。 |
| “Our goal continues to be to send a clear message to Russia or others not to do this to us, because we can do stuff to you,” he said shortly before leaving office. “Some of it, we will do publicly. Some of it we will do in a way that they know, but not everybody will.” | “我们的目标仍然是向俄罗斯或其他国家发出一个明确的信息，不要对我们这样做，因为我们也可以对你们这样做，”奥巴马在离任前不久说。“我们会公开做一些事。我们也会以他们知道、但其他人不知道的方式做一些事。” |
| A New Gray Zone | 新的灰色地带 |
| By the end of the decade, many military and intelligence planners had come around to a view articulated by Joshua Rovner, who was scholar-in-residence at the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command until 2019. | 到本世纪第一个十年末时，许多军事和情报规划者开始接受由乔舒亚·罗夫纳(Joshua Rovner)阐明的一种观点。罗夫纳在2019年之前一直是美国国家安全局(National Security Agency)和美国网络司令部的常驻学者。 |
| In almost all cases, Mr. Rovner wrote in an essay for the site War on the Rocks, hacking had become not a kind of war but “an open-ended competition among rival states” that resembles, and is often an extension of, espionage. | 在一篇发表在“战争困境”(War on the Rocks)网站的文章中，罗夫纳写道，在几乎所有的情况下，黑客攻击都已不是一种战争，而是“敌对国家之间的无限制竞争”，类似于间谍活动，而且往往是间谍活动的延伸。 |
| That new understanding “puts the cyberspace competition in perspective,” he added, “but it requires a willingness to live with ambiguity.” | 这种新的理解“让网络空间的竞争得到正确的看待，”他补充道，“但它要求人们愿意接受模糊性。” |
| Espionage contests are never won. They carry gains and losses for all sides, and they operate in what military theorists call a “gray zone” that is neither war nor peace. | 间谍竞赛永远没有赢家，各方都会有赢有输，这种活动在军事理论家所说的“灰色地带”进行，既不是战争也不是和平。 |
| As governments have learned which operations will draw what sort of response, the world has gradually converged on unwritten rules for cyber-competition. | 随着各国政府了解到哪些行动将得到什么样的回应，世界已逐渐趋向于网络竞争的不成文规则。 |
| The scholars Michael P. Fischerkeller and Richard J. Harknett have described the result as “competitive interaction within those boundaries, rather than spiraling escalation to new levels of conflict.” | 学者迈克尔·P·费舍凯勒(Michael P. Fischerkeller)和理查德·J·哈克内特(Richard J. Harknett)将这一结果描述为“在这些界限内的竞争性互动，而不是螺旋式升级到新的冲突水平。” |
| It is not that governments promise never to cross those bounds. Rather, they understand that doing so will bring certain punishments that may not be worth enduring. | 这并不是说各国政府都承诺永远不越过这些界限。而是他们明白，越界会带来某些不值得忍受的惩罚。 |
| The scholars called these norms “still in a formative phase,” waiting to be proven out by governments testing one another’s tolerance and the consequences of exceeding it. But they have gelled enough that the accepted contours are coming into view. | 学者们称这些规范“仍处于形成阶段”，有待各国政府对彼此的容忍程度以及超越容忍的后果进行检验。但各国政府已对正在形成的接受范围有了足够的共识。 |
| Mr. Obama’s reference to secret and public retaliations hinted at what has since become standard procedure. Routine hacks may provoke a secret retaliation — for instance taking down government systems responsible for the incident, to punish without risking escalation or a broader diplomatic breakdown. | 奥巴马提到的公开和非公开的报复，暗示了自那以来已成为标准程序的状况。常规的黑客攻击可能会引发非公开的报复——例如，拿下对黑客事件负有责任的政府系统，以惩罚为目的，但不冒风险引起事态升级或更大范围的外交破裂。 |
| But governments may answer major hacks with a public counterattack, signaling to the target and other governments that the incident went too far. The United States, for instance, let it be known that its hackers infiltrated Russia’s power grid, a calibrated escalation meant to convince Moscow that election meddling was not worth the trouble. | 但各国政府可能会对重大黑客攻击进行公开反击，向目标和其他国家的政府发出信号，表明事件做过头了。例如，美国让全世界知道，美国的黑客侵入了俄罗斯的电网，这是一种经过慎重考虑的升级，目的是使莫斯科相信，干预选举是不值得做的事情。 |
| Russia’s 2016 conduct also led officials to pursue “deterrence by denial” — methods to make similar hacks less likely to succeed. The goal was to raise the cost of such attacks while reducing their benefit. | 俄罗斯2016年的行为还导致官员采取了“以拒绝来威慑”的方法，这种方法降低类似黑客攻击成功的可能性，目的是提高这类攻击的成本，同时减少其收益。 |
| President Biden, in arraying world governments to condemn Chinese cybertheft this week, is attempting to impose a diplomatic cost to which Beijing may be more sensitive than Moscow. It is a tactic that appeared to work under Mr. Obama. But, with relations souring, Beijing may feel it has less to lose. | 本周，拜登总统将世界各国政府召集起来谴责中国网络盗窃行为的做法，是在试图让中国付出外交上的代价，中国在这方面可能比俄罗斯更敏感。这种做法似乎在奥巴马当总统时奏效。但随着两国关系恶化，中国政府可能觉得它已经没有多少担心失去的东西了。 |
| A Decentralized Danger | 一种分散的危险 |
| There is little that can truly prevent governments from choosing to accept the risks that come with initiating a cyberattack. And, because offensive cybertechnology has so consistently outpaced defensive measures, some of those hacks will inevitably succeed. | 没有什么做法能真正阻止各国政府选择接受发动网络攻击所带来的风险。而且，由于进攻性网络技术的发展始终快于防御措施，其中一些黑客攻击必然会取得成功。 |
| That dynamic is only accelerating, analysts and officials say, as governments shift more of their hacking to private firms and outright criminals. Moscow was an early innovator, hiring freelance hackers abroad, including a 20-year-old Canadian, to infiltrate American government accounts. | 分析师和官员说，随着各国政府将更多的黑客攻击转包给私营公司和纯粹的犯罪分子，这种动态只在加快。莫斯科是这方面的早期创新者，它雇了国外的自由职业黑客，包括一名20岁的加拿大人，去入侵美国政府的账号。 |
| The hacker-for-hire shadow industry has exploded in recent years. Security researchers have identified highly skilled groups targeting governments, legal and financial firms, real estate developers, Middle Eastern energy companies and the World Health Organization. | 近年来，雇佣黑客的影子行业呈爆炸式增长。网络安全研究人员已确定了一些针对政府、法律和金融公司、房地产开发商、中东能源公司和世界卫生组织的有高度熟练技能的团伙。 |
| Most are thought to be hired through dark web platforms that offer anonymity for both parties. Though their labors seem to benefit certain governments or corporations, identifying their employer is often impossible, reducing the risk of retaliation. | 人们认为，大多数团伙都是通过让双方保持匿名的暗网平台雇来的。尽管这些团伙的工作似乎让某些政府或公司受益，但确定他们的雇主是谁往往不可能，这就减少了报复的风险。 |
| Globalization and advances in consumer technology have opened a near-bottomless pool of hackers-for-hire. Many are thought to be young people in economically troubled countries, where legitimate work is scarce, especially during the pandemic. Off-the-shelf hacking software and expanding broadband allows almost anyone to put out a shingle. | 全球化和消费者技术的进步提供了一个几乎用之不尽的雇佣黑客后备。人们认为，许多雇佣黑客是经济困难国家的年轻人，这些国家的合法工作很少，尤其是在新冠病毒大流行期间。现成的黑客软件和不断扩大的宽带网让几乎所有的人都能挂牌开业。 |
| Some operate openly. An Indian firm offered to help clients snoop on business rivals and partners. The Pegasus software at the center of this week’s allegations of worldwide hacks on journalists and dissidents is sold by NSO Group, an Israeli company. | 一些人公开活动。一家印度公司提供帮助客户窥探商业对手和合作伙伴的服务。本周被指控在世界范围内对记者和异见者进行黑客攻击的“飞马”(Pegasus)软件是由以色列公司NSO集团出售的。 |
| The shifting landscape hints at the gap between what policymakers expected of the cyberconflict era and what it actually became. Major attacks like Washington’s against Iran or Russia’s during the 2016 elections happen less frequently than feared. | 形势的变化暗示了政策制定者对网络冲突时代的预期与现实之间的差距。2016年美国大选期间，华盛顿针对伊朗或俄罗斯进行的重大网络攻击并不像人们担心的那样频繁。 |
| Rather, the new normal is small but constant hacks. Chinese-sponsored criminals raiding dozens of companies over years. Paranoid officials snooping on a local journalist, rival politician — or even nutrition advocates pushing for a soda tax. And all increasingly conducted through third parties or private software that may be less sophisticated but is easier to spread and easier to deny. | 新常态反而是小型但持续的黑客攻击。中国在多年时间里一直资助犯罪分子对数十家公司进行网络攻击。多疑的官员打探当地记者、竞争对手政客，甚至是推动汽水税的营养倡导者。所有这些都越来越多地通过第三方或私人软件进行，这些软件可能不那么复杂，但更容易传播，也更容易否认。 |
| No one such hack is likely to upend the international order. But, cumulatively, they suggest a coming era of omnipresent digital theft, influence peddling and snooping. And it may now be a time in which, as many of the reported Pegasus victims learned this week, almost no one is too pedestrian to be targeted. | 一次这种黑客攻击不可能颠覆国际秩序。但它们加在一起暗示着一个无处不在的数字盗窃、兜售影响和打探的时代即将到来。正如报道中的许多“飞马”的受害者本周了解到的那样，在这个时代，也许几乎没有人会平凡到不会成为攻击目标。 |
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