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| When President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. moves into the White House, he will inherit a relationship with China that is at its lowest point in decades. Among the issues on his to-do list are tariffs, which he has said he plans to maintain when he takes over; how to handle human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang region; and a tech Cold War that has raised questions over data, sovereignty and power. | 候任总统拜登搬入白宫后，将面对处于几十年来最低点的美中关系。在他的待办事项清单中有：关税问题，他曾说过，他计划在接任后保持现有关税；如何处理中国新疆地区的侵犯人权行为；以及一场引发了人们对数据、主权和权力质疑的科技冷战。 |
| All the while, Mr. Biden will be rebuilding an economy laid low by the pandemic. That could make focusing on foreign matters more fraught, especially a relationship in need of as much repair work as the one with China. | 拜登一直说将要重建被大流行压垮的经济。这可能会让专注外交事务变得令人忧虑，尤其是需要很多修复工作的对华关系。 |
| As part of the DealBook D.C. Policy Project, The New York Times gathered a virtual panel of experts in early December to discuss the state of U.S.-China relations today, and how they might change during the Biden administration. | 作为交易录华盛顿政策研究课题的一部分，《纽约时报》(The New York Times)于12月初召集了一个线上专家小组，讨论当今美中关系的现状，以及在拜登执政期间它们将会发生怎样的变化。 |
| The participants: | 参与者名单： |
| • Damien Ma, director of MacroPolo at the Paulson Institute | • 保尔森基金会(Paulson Institute)的麦克罗波洛智库(MacroPolo)主任马旸(Damien Ma) |
| • Winston Ma, adjunct professor at New York University School of Law | • 纽约大学(New York University)法学院兼职教授马文彦(Winston Ma) |
| • Dina Powell McCormick, global head of sustainability and inclusive growth at Goldman Sachs | • 高盛(Goldman Sachs)可持续发展和包容性增长全球负责人蒂娜·鲍威尔·麦考密克(Dina Powell McCormick) |
| • James McGregor, chairman of Greater China at APCO Worldwide | • 安可顾问公司(APCO Worldwide)大中华区董事长麦健陆(James McGregor) |
| • Andy Purdy, chief security officer at Huawei Technologies USA | • 华为美国首席安全官安迪·珀迪(Andy Purdy) |
| • Samm Sacks, cybersecurity policy and china digital economy fellow at New America and fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center | • 新美国智库(New America)的网络安全政策和中国数字经济研究员、耶鲁大学法学院蔡中曾中国中心(Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center)研究员萨姆·萨克斯(Samm Sacks) |
| • Faiza J. Saeed, presiding partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore | • 科瓦斯-斯怀恩-摩尔国际律师事务所(Cravath, Swaine & Moore)首席合伙人法伊扎·赛义德(Faiza J. Saeed) |
| • Mark Shafir, co-head of global mergers and acquisitions at Citigroup | • 花旗集团(Citigroup)全球并购联席主管马克·沙菲尔(Mark Shafir) |
| • Moderated by Rebecca Blumenstein, The Times’s deputy managing editor | • 由时报副主编丽贝卡·布鲁门施泰因(Rebecca Blumenstein)主持 |
| Mr. Biden won’t let up on China, but will be selective in picking fights. | 拜登不会放任中国，但会选择性地进行挑战。 |
| The panelists generally agreed that Mr. Biden will be tough on China, continuing the path set by President Trump. “I think style will change. Substance, in the short term, is likely to stay the same,” said Dina Powell McCormick of Goldman Sachs. “Over the medium and long term, I think that he’s inherited a relationship that’s very different than the one he had four years ago, or during the Obama-Biden administration. I think it’s a unique opportunity.” | 小组成员普遍认为，拜登将对中国保持强硬立场，继续特朗普总统设定的道路。“我认为风格会改变。从短期来看，实质可能保持不变，”高盛的狄娜·鲍威尔·麦考密克说。“从中长期来看，我认为他所接手的关系与四年前，奥巴马-拜登政府时期的关系截然不同。我认为这是一个难得的机会。” |
| That opportunity could entail Mr. Biden choosing to be more collaborative with China on things like climate change and vaccine distribution, in hopes of gaining more leverage in the areas, like technology, where he wants the United States to compete more aggressively with China. | 这次机会可能使拜登选择在气候变化和疫苗分配等问题上与中国加强合作，希望在技术等领域获得更大的影响力，在这些领域他希望美国与中国进行更激烈的竞争。 |
| Mr. Biden “is going to continue to take a hard line,” said Samm Sacks of New America and the Yale Law School, but will adopt “a more targeted approach,” asking “where does genuine national security risk exist and then coming up with solutions to solve for that.” | 新美国智库和耶鲁法学院的萨姆·萨克斯说，拜登“将继续采取强硬路线”，但将采取“更有针对性的方法”，他会问“真正的国家安全风险存在于何处，然后找出方案来解决”。 |
| The battle over tech supremacy will also be fought far from Beijing and Washington. | 争夺科技地位的战斗也将在远离北京和华盛顿的地方展开。 |
| Ms. Sacks warned against focusing too closely on the United States and China alone. “The tech competition between China and the U.S. is increasingly not going to play out in each other’s countries. It’s going to play out in other parts of the world,” she said. | 萨克斯警告，不要把注意力仅仅放在美国和中国。“美中之间的技术竞争越来越不会在彼此的国家中展开。它会在世界其他地区上演。”她说。 |
| “Biden is coming in talking a big game about working with allies and partners at a moment when the digital divide between Europe and the U.S. could not be deeper,” she added. “And I think that’s going to have to be one of his first orders of business: to resolve the digital chasm with Europe.” | “拜登将要与盟友和伙伴合作下一场大棋，而此时欧洲和美国之间的数字技术鸿沟极深，”她还说。“而且我认为这将是他的首要任务之一：解决和欧洲之间的数字技术差距。” |
| Part of a cross-country collaboration may involve creating an international framework to deal with challenges like how to protect data flows, said Andy Purdy, the chief security officer of Huawei Technologies U.S.A. “We have to ramp up the efforts collaborating with our partners to have independent conformance and independent testing programs, so we have some objective basis for knowing which products and services are worthy of trust,” he said. “We need to collaborate, globally, to improve the capabilities for security and assurance and the capabilities for transparency.” | 华为美国的首席安全官安迪·珀迪说，跨国合作的一部分可能涉及建立一个国际框架来应对诸如如何保护数据流等挑战。“我们必须加大与合作伙伴的合作力度，以拥有独立的一致性和独立的测试程序，这样我们就可以对于知道哪些产品和服务值得信任有一些客观基准，”他说。“我们需要在全球范围内进行协作，以提高安全和保障能力以及透明度。” |
| Talking about the U.S.-China relationship requires talking about industrial policy. | 谈论美中关系需要谈论产业政策。 |
| In describing the state of the play, “it’s American underperformance versus Chinese overreach,” said James McGregor of APCO Worldwide. “China went too far and even pushed business away, and we have just been pretty lame here in investing in ourselves.” | “美国的表现不佳，中国用力过猛，”安可顾问公司大中华区董事长麦健陆在描述竞争的状态时说。“中国走得太远，甚至连生意都不要，而我们在自我投资方面一直很蹩脚。” |
| Faiza Saeed of Cravath, Swaine & Moore said American and Chinese companies were not competing on a “level playing field,” with China’s favored firms getting more backing from their government than rivals in the United States. This is not what many expected when China opened up its economy to the world, she said: | 科瓦斯-斯怀恩-摩尔国际律师事务所合伙人法伊扎·赛义德说，美国和中国的公司并未在“公平竞赛的环境”下竞争，与美国的竞争对手相比，受到中国青睐的企业更能得到政府的支持。这并不是中国向世界开放经济时人们所期望的，她说： |
| “Western democracies thought that opening up to China was going to change China, and what we’ve seen over the last 20 years is that we’ve been changed. And there are all these forces that are undercutting cohesion in our own society that are not China’s fault. China has always been focused on its own growth and independence, and protecting its independence, but we didn’t get what we thought we were going to get from opening up and looking the other way.” | “西方民主国家认为，向中国开放将改变中国，而过去20年我们看到的是我们被改变了。所有这些削弱我们自身社会凝聚力的力量不是中国的错。中国一直致力于自己的成长和独立，并维护其独立性，但在我们开放又对此视若不见的过程中，并没有得到我们想要的结果。” |
| That said, for American policymakers the answer is not necessarily to “become more like China to beat China,” said Damien Ma of the Paulson Institute: | 虽然这么说，但对于美国的决策者来说，答案并不一定是“变得像中国一样去打败中国”，保尔森基金会的马旸说： |
| “If you look at what the Chinese are doing, they’re actually getting less into industrial policy because they’ve realized that has produced more bubbles and more cost than it’s been worth. Yes, they got batteries. Yes, they got solar panels. But it’s been a very mixed success. So even in China, they’re questioning how much they want to push industrial policy.” | “如果你看看中国人在做什么，你会发现他们实际上在产业政策方面的投入变少了，因为他们意识到那样已经造成了更多的泡沫和比价值更高的成本。是的，他们有了电池产业。是的，他们有了太阳能板。但这是一个非常喜忧参半的成功。因此，即使在中国，他们也在质疑要把产业政策推到多高。” |
| Look to the semiconductor industry to gauge of the balance of power. | 关于半导体产业的实力平衡 |
| Winston Ma of the N.Y.U. law school, who previously ran the North American office of China’s sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation, said that semiconductors was an industry in which China’s industrial policy might have met its match. The government continues to support it, but he has not seen private venture capital pour in at the same pace as with artificial intelligence, for example. The unexpected loss of a top player of the Chinese game “Go” to software developed by Google in 2017 captured a lot of attention, and now “you have lots of A.I. start-ups trying to compete with the U.S.,” he said. | 纽约大学法学院的马文彦此前曾任中国主权财富基金中国投资有限公司北美办事处负责人，他说，在半导体产业，中国的产业政策可能遇到了对手。比如，虽然政府继续支持，但他还没有看到私人风险投资以在人工智能产业那样的速度涌入。他说，2017年中国一位顶级选手出人意料地在围棋比赛中输给谷歌开发的软件，引起了广泛关注，现在“就有了很多试图与美国竞争的人工智能初创企业”。 |
| That he doesn’t see the same enthusiasm from the private sector for semiconductors is a “good indication that it is still very much a government-led push, compared to something that the market feels there’s a chance.” | 他没有看到私营领域对半导体有同样的热情，这“很能说明，与市场认为有机可乘的情况相比，该产业在很大程度上仍由政府主导推进”。 |
| The global semiconductor industry is going through a phase of consolidation, which recently included Nvidia’s $40 billion acquisition of Arm. The deal would require Chinese regulators’ approval because it would have a big impact on the market there, and Beijing’s resistance to blessing Qualcomm’s $44 billion deal for NXP amid the depths of a trade war with the United States two years ago led to the deal’s collapse. | 全球半导体产业正在经历一个整合阶段，包括最近英伟达(Nvidia)斥资400亿美元收购Arm。这笔交易将需要中国监管机构的批准，因为它将对那里的市场产生重大影响，而两年前，在与美国的贸易战最激烈的时候，北京曾拒绝批准高通(Qualcomm)440亿美元收购恩智浦(NXP)，导致交易的失败。 |
| “People are putting significant money where their mouth is,” said Mark Shafir, a top deal maker at Citigroup, referring to the boldness of Nvidia’s bid despite the potential geopolitical pitfalls. On the risk of American companies trying to consummate deals during such a fraught period in U.S.-China relations, Mr. Shafir described the mood as “it was time to try to do some things, and there was one C.E.O. who told me: ‘I don’t know how much worse it can get.’” | “人们把大笔的钱花在了刀刃上，”花旗集团的马克·沙菲尔表示，他指的是尽管存在潜在的地缘政治陷阱，但英伟达仍然大胆提出收购。对于美国企业试图在美中关系如此紧张的时期圆满完成交易的风险，沙菲尔形容他们的想法是，“是时候尝试做一些事了，有一位CEO告诉我：‘我不知道情况还能有多糟。’” |
| “I hope that we’re at the nadir of this, but I can’t sit there as a deal practitioner and say with any degree of certainty it’s going to get a hell of a lot better,” he added, noting the White House’s blacklisting of Chinese tech firms and the arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer in Canada at the request of the United States. | “我希望现在已经是最低点了，但作为一个交易从业者，我不能坐在那里抱着任何肯定的态度说，情况将会大大好转，”他补充道，指出了白宫将中国科技企业列入黑名单，以及加拿大应美国要求逮捕华为首席财务官的举动。 |
| He doesn’t see the prospects for a lowering of tensions soon. “I do believe ultimately that there will be some market rationality here, but it’s not happening in 2021,” he said. “We’re in a ‘just say no world,’ and that’s got to change.” | 他不认为紧张局势会很快缓解。“我确实相信市场最终会有一定的理性出现，但这不会在2021年发生，”他说。“我们生活在一个‘只说不的世界’，这种现状必须改变。” |
| And in the end, follow the money. | 最后，向钱走。 |
| American financial giants like BlackRock and Goldman Sachs have recently expanded in China after being allowed to take majority control of local divisions for the first time. In letting them in, Mr. McGregor said, Beijing might have other motives in mind, revealing the multilayered diplomacy that will establish the relationship between the two countries for years to come: | 美国金融巨头贝莱德(BlackRock)和高盛最近在中国扩张了业务，此前他们首次获准掌握其在中国分部的多数控股权。麦健陆说，北京让他们进入市场可能是出于其他动机，揭示了将在未来几年确立两国关系的多层次外交手段： |
| “China does not do anything that’s not in its own complete self-interest. Allowing American companies in there right now and giving them a sliver of the market is good because it will help with best practices, and they need help in learning how to manage people’s money and help with their investments. But also they know that the financial services industry is America’s most politically powerful industry, and if they give all these big companies a sliver of the market, they will be in Washington telling regulators: ‘Don’t you do anything against China because you’ll hurt my market share.’” | “中国不会做任何不符合自身利益的事。现在允许美国企业进入，给他们一点市场份额是好的，因为这将有助于最佳营商实践，他们需要在学习如何管理人们的资金，以及帮助自身做好投资的问题上得到帮助。但他们也知道，金融服务业是美国最具政治影响力的行业，如果他们给所有这些大企业一点点市场，这些企业都会到华盛顿告诉监管机构：‘不要跟中国对着干，因为你们会损害我的市场份额。’” |
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