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战争与和平　
War and Peace

英文中文双语对照双语交替

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CHAPTER I

第一章

NAPOLEON BEGAN THE WAR with Russia because he could not help going to Dresden, being dazzled by the homage paid him there, putting on the Polish uniform, yielding to the stimulating influence of a June morning, and giving way to an outburst of fury in the presence of Kurakin and afterwards of Balashev.

拿破仑所以要同俄国开始打仗，是因为他不能不到德累斯顿，不能不被荣耀地位所迷惑，不能不穿上波兰军装，不能不受到六月早晨诱发出的野心所影响，不能不先当着库拉金的面，而后当着巴拉舍夫的面突然发怒。

Alexander refused all negotiations because he felt himself personally insulted. Barclay de Tolly did his utmost to command the army in the best way possible, so as to do his duty and gain the reputation of a great general.

亚历山大所以要拒绝一切谈判，是因为他感到自己受了侮辱。巴克莱·德·托利尽力以最好的方式指挥军队，是为了竭尽自己的天职，从而获得大统帅的荣誉。罗斯托夫所以跃马向法军冲锋，是因为他在平坦的田野上就忍不住要纵马驰骋，正是这样，参加这场战争的无数的人，他们都是按照各自的特性、习惯、环境和目的而行动。他们感到害怕，徒骛虚名；他们感到高兴，义愤填膺；他们发表议论，认为他们知道自己所做的事，并且是为了自己而做的；其实他们都是未意识到自己当了历史的工具，做了他们自己不明白而我们却了解的工作。所有实际的活动家不可避免的命运就是这样，他们所处的地位越高，就越不自由。

Rostov charged the French because he could not resist the temptation to gallop across the level plain. And all the innumerable persons who took part in the war acted similarly, in accordance with their personal peculiarities, habits, circumstances, and aims. They were all impelled by fear or vanity, enjoyment, indignation, or national consideration, supposing that they knew what they were about and that they were acting independently, while they were all the involuntary tools of history and were working out a result concealed from themselves but comprehensible to us. Such is the invariable fate of all practical leaders, and the higher their place in the social hierarchy, the less free they are.

现在，一八一二年的活动家，他们早已退出自己的历史舞台，他们个人的兴趣也早已消失得无影无踪，留在我们面前的只有当时的某些历史后果。

Now the leading men of 1812 have long left their places; their personal interests have vanished, leaving no trace, and nothing remains before us but the historical results of the time.

天意差使所有这些人竭力追求他们自己的目的，从而造成一个巨大的历史后果。当时任何一个人，无论是拿破仑还是亚历山大，更不用说战争的某一个参加者，对这个历史后果也未曾有一丁点儿预料到。

But once let us admit that the people of Europe under Napoleon's leadership had to make their way into the heart of Russia and there to perish, and all the self-contradictory, meaningless, cruel actions of the men who took part in this war become intelligible to us.

现在我们已经很清楚，一八一二年法军覆灭的原因。谁也毋庸再争辩，拿破仑率领的军队覆灭的原因有二：一是他们深入俄国腹地，却迟迟未作好过冬的准备；二是由于焚烧俄国城市和在俄国人民中激起对敌人的仇恨，从而形成了战争的性质。但是，当时不仅没有人预见到（现在这似乎很明显的了），只有这样，世界上最优良、而且由最优秀的统帅所指挥的八十万军队在碰到与自己弱一倍的，也没有经验，而且也由没有经验的统帅所指挥的俄国军队时，才能遭致覆灭；与此同时，不仅没有人预见到这一点，而且俄国人方面一切的努力经常都是妨碍那唯一能够拯救俄国的事业的实现，而法国人方面，尽管有所谓拿破仑的军事天才和战斗的经验，但却用尽一切的努力，在夏末向莫斯科推进，也就是在做使法军必然走向灭亡的事情。

Providence compelled all those men in striving for the attainment of their personal aims to combine in accomplishing one immense result, of which no one individual man (not Napoleon, not Alexander, still less any one taking practical part in the campaign) had the slightest inkling.

在有关一八一二年的历史论著中，法国的作者总是喜欢论及与时拿破仑如何感到战线拉长的危险，如何寻觅决战的机会，拿破仑的元帅如何劝他在斯摩棱斯克按兵不动，并援引类似一些别的论据，证明与时就已经意识到战争的危险性；而俄国的作者则更喜欢谈论，从战役一开始就有一个引诱拿破仑深入俄国腹地的西徐亚人式的作战计划，这个计划有人认为是普弗尔拟的，有人认为是某个法国人拟的，有人认为是托尔拟的，有人认为是亚历山大皇帝本人拟的，而且引用有笔记、方案和书信为证，其中确实有这种作战方案的暗示。但是有关预见所发生的事件的一切暗示，不论是俄国人还是法国人所为，之所以现在公诸于世，只不过因为既成的事件证明了其暗示的正确性。如果事件没有发生，那末这些暗示就会被人遗忘。就像现在成千上万相反的暗示和假设，在与时很流行，但是被证明是不正确，因而被人所忘了一样。关于每一个事件的结局，总是有那么多的假设，以致不管事件的结局是什么，总有人要说：“我与时就说过，事情就是这样的结局。”但是他们却完全忘却了，在无数的假设之中还有许多完全与此相反的意见。

Now it is clear to us what was the cause of the destruction of the French army in 1812. No one disputes that the cause of the loss of Napoleon's French forces was, on one hand, their entering at too late a season upon a winter march in the heart of Russia without sufficient preparation; and on the other, the character the war had assumed from the burning of Russian towns and the hatred the enemy aroused in the peasantry. But obvious as it seems now, no one at the time foresaw that this was the only means by which the best army in the world, eight hundred thousand strong, led by the best of generals, could be defeated in a conflict with the inexperienced Russian army of half the strength, led by inexperienced generals. Not only was this utterly unforeseen, but every effort indeed was being continually made on the Russian side to hinder the one means that could save Russia; and in spite of the experience and so-called military genius of Napoleon, every effort was made on the French side to push on to Moscow at the end of the summer, that is to do the very thing bound to bring about their ruin.

谈到拿破仑已经感到战线拉长的危险，谈到俄国人方面有意诱敌深入俄国腹地，显然其假设都是属于这一类的推测；只有历史学家才能非常牵强附会地把那样的推测强加在拿破仑和他的将帅身上，把那样的计划强加在俄国军事将领身上。所有这些事实都与这类假设完全相反。在俄国整个战争时期不但没有诱敌深入俄国腹地的意图，而且从敌人刚入侵俄国时候起，就千方百计地阻止法军的深入；至于拿破仑不但不怕战线拉长，而且他每前进一步就像打了胜仗而得意洋洋，也不像过去历次战役那样急于寻找新的战机。

In historical works on the year 1812, the French writers are very fond of saying that Napoleon was aware of the danger of lengthening out his line, that he sought a decisive engagement, that his marshals advised him to stay at Smolensk, and similar statements to show that even at the time the real danger of the campaign was seen. The Russian historians are still fonder of declaring that from the beginning of the campaign there existed a plan of Scythian warfare by leading Napoleon on into the heart of Russia. And this plan is ascribed by some writers to Pfuhl, by others to some Frenchman, and by others to Barclay de Tolly; while other writers give the credit of this supposed scheme to the Emperor Alexander himself, supporting their view by documents, proclamations, and letters, in which such a course of action certainly is hinted at. But all these hints at foreseeing what actually did happen on the French as well as on the Russian side are only conspicuous now because the event justified them. If the event had not come to pass, these hints would have been forgotten, as thousands and millions of suggestions and suppositions are now forgotten that were current at the period, but have been shown by time to be unfounded and so have been consigned to oblivion. There are always so many presuppositions as to the cause of every event that, however the matter ends, there are always people who will say: “I said at the time that it would be so”: quite oblivious of the fact that among the numerous suppositions they made there were others too suggesting just the opposite course of events.

战争刚一开始打响时，我们的军队就被切断，而我们所力求达到的唯一目的，是要把军队会集起来，虽然军队的会师对退却和诱敌深入腹地并没有好处。皇帝御驾亲临部队，为的是鼓舞部队坚守俄国的每寸土地，而不是为了退却。按照普弗尔的计划，在德里萨部署庞大的兵营，从而不打算再后退。皇帝为每后退一步总要责备总司令。可是不但莫斯科遭到焚烧，而且还让敌人打到斯摩棱斯克，这是连皇帝也觉得是不可思议的事。与军队会合的时候，皇帝因为斯摩棱斯克的失陷和惨遭焚烧，未能在城外决一大战而感到极为愤懑。

The notion that Napoleon was aware of the danger of extending his line, and that the Russians had a scheme for drawing the enemy into the heart of Russia, obviously belong to the same category; and only historians with a great bias can ascribe such reflections to Napoleon and his marshals, or such plans to the Russian generals. All the facts are directly opposed to such a view. Far from desiring to lure the French into the heart of Russia, the Russians did their utmost to arrest their progress throughout the war from the time they crossed the frontier. And far from dreading the extension of his line of communications, Napoleon rejoiced at every step forward as a triumph, and did not seek pitched battles as eagerly as he had done in his previous campaigns.

皇帝是这么想的，而俄国的将帅和俄国的全体人民想到我们的军队退到腹地，他们就更加愤慨了。

At the very beginning of the campaign, our armies were divided up, and the sole aim for which we strove was to unite them; though there was no benefit to be derived from uniting them if our object was to retreat and draw the enemy into the heart of the country. The Emperor was with the army to inspire it not to yield an inch of Russian soil and on no account to retreat. An immense camp was fortified at Drissa in accordance with Pfuhl's plan, and it was not proposed to retreat further. The Tsar reprimanded the commander-in-chief for every retreat. The Tsar can never have anticipated the burning of Moscow, or even the enemy's presence at Smolensk, and when the armies had been reunited, the Tsar was indignant at the taking and burning of Smolensk without a general engagement having been fought before its walls. Such was the Tsar's feeling, but the Russian generals, and the whole Russian people, were even more indignant at the idea of our men retreating.

拿破仑切断了俄国军队之后，他继续向俄国腹地推进，并放弃了几次决战的机会。八月他在斯摩棱斯克一心只想如何推进，可是我们现在却看出，这种继续推进对他来说显然是自取灭亡的。

Napoleon, after dividing up the army, moved on into the heart of the country, letting slip several opportunities of an engagement. In August he was in Smolensk and thinking of nothing but advancing further, though, as we see now, that advance meant inevitable ruin.

事实显然说明，拿破仑既没有预见到向莫斯科进军的危险性，亚历山大和俄国的将军们那时也没有想到引诱拿破仑深入腹地，而他们所想到的却与此相反。引诱拿破仑深入俄国腹地，并非出于什么人的计划（谁也不会相信这种事的可能性），而是由于未曾料到必然会发生什么，未曾料到唯一拯救俄国的途径是什么的那些参战人员的极其复杂的勾心斗角、阴谋诡计、私人目的和种种渴望所致。一切都是偶然发生的。军队在战争初期被切断。我们力求使军队会合，显然的目的是打一仗，阻止敌人进攻，但在力求使军队会合时应避免和最强大的敌人作战，不自觉地形成锐角形撤退，从而我们就把法军引到了斯摩棱斯克。然而不仅可以这样说，我们形成锐角形撤退，是因为法军在我们两军之间推进，这个夹角变得愈锐，我们也就因此退得愈远，是因为巴克莱·德·托利是一个不孚众望的德国人，而巴格拉季翁（受巴克莱指挥的军官）又很憎恨他，所以巴格拉季翁统帅第二军，力求尽可能地迟迟不与巴克莱会师，为了不受他指挥，巴格拉季翁迟迟不去会师尽管所有的指挥官主要目的是会师），因为他觉得在行军中会使自己的军队受到危险，对他最有利的是向左向南退却、骚扰敌方的侧翼和后方，在乌克兰补充他的军队。看来，他所以能想到这一点，是因为他不愿意隶属于令人憎恨的，而且级别比他低的德国人巴克莱。

The fact shows perfectly clearly that Napoleon foresaw no danger in the advance on Moscow, and that Alexander and the Russian generals did not dream at the time of luring Napoleon on, but aimed at the very opposite. Napoleon was drawn on into Russia, not through any plans—no one dreamed of the possibility of it—but simply through the complex play of intrigues and desires and motives of the actors in the war, who had no conception of what was to come and of what was the sole means of saving Russia. Everything came to pass by chance. The army was split up early in the campaign. We tried to effect a junction between the parts with the obvious intention of fighting a battle and checking the enemy's advance; and in this effort to effect a junction, avoiding a battle with a far stronger enemy, we were forced to retreat at an acute angle, and so drew the French after us to Smolensk. But it is not enough to say that both parts of the army retreated on lines inclined at an acute angle, because the French were advancing between the two armies. The angle was made the more acute and we retreated further because Barclay de Tolly, an unpopular German, was detested by Bagration, and the latter, in command of the second half of the army, did his utmost to delay a junction with Barclay de Tolly in order to avoid being under his command. Bagration delayed the junction of the armies, though this was the chief aim of all the authorities, because he believed that he would expose his army to danger on the march, and that it would be more advantageous for him to retreat more to the left and the south, annoying the enemy on the flank and rear, and reinforcing his army in Ukraine. And he believed this, because he did not want to put himself under the command of the German Barclay, who was his junior in the service, and personally disliked by him.

皇帝亲临军队，是为了鼓舞士气，但是他的御驾亲征和犹豫不决，以及大批的顾问出谋献策，反而破坏了第一军的战斗力，于是军队后退了。

The Emperor accompanied the army in order to excite its patriotic ardour; but his presence and inability to decide on any course of action and the immense number of counsellors and plans that swarmed about him, nullified all action on the part of the first army, and that army too had to retreat.

他们原打算坚守德里萨阵地，但出人意外，图谋与上总司令的保罗西以他的精力影响亚历山大，于是普弗尔的整个计划则被放弃，而一切军务就托付给巴克莱。但是巴克莱不孚众望，他的权力却受到了限制。

At the camp at Drissa it was proposed to take a stand. But the energy of Paulucci, scheming to become a leading general, affected Alexander; and Pfuhl's whole plan was abandoned, and the scheme of campaign intrusted to Barclay. But as the latter did not inspire complete confidence, his power too was limited.

军队被打散后，既没有统一的指挥，巴克莱又孚众望。一方面，由于这种混乱，军队被切断，加之总司令德国人的声誉不高，就表现出犹豫不决，避免了一切战斗（假如军队会合在一起，而且不是巴克莱做总司令，那就非打一仗不可）；另一方面，对德国人的愤慨越来越强烈，爱国主义的热情则越来越高涨。

The armies were split up, there was no unity, no supreme command: Barclay was unpopular. But on one side the confusion and division and unpopularity of the German commander-in-chief led to vacillation and to avoiding a battle, which would have been inevitable had the armies been united and any one but Barclay in command of them. And on the other hand, it all led to a growing indignation with the Germans and a growing fervour of patriotism.

后来皇帝终于离开军队，给他离开军队找到一个唯一最好的借口，那就是他必须鼓舞首都人民掀起一场人民战争。皇帝的莫斯科之行，使俄国的军队增加到三倍。

At last the Tsar left the army, and, as the only suitable excuse to get rid of him, the happy suggestion was made that he must rouse up the people in the capitals to wage the war on a truly national scale. And the Tsar's visit to Moscow did in fact treble the forces of the Russian army. The Tsar left the army in the hope that the commander-in-chief would be able to act alone, and that more decisive measures would be taken. But the commander's position became weaker and even more difficult. Bennigsen, the Grand Duke, and a swarm of adjutant generals, remained with the army to watch over the actions of the commander-in-chief, and to urge him to greater activity; and Barclay, feeling less than ever free to act under the watchful gaze of all these “eyes of the Tsar,” became still more cautious and anxious to avoid a pitched battle, and clung to a prudent inaction. The Grand Duke hinted at treachery, and demanded a general engagement. Lubomirsky, Bronnitsky, Vlotsky, and others of the same sort, helped to swell the clamour to such a point that Barclay, on the pretext of sending papers to the Tsar in Petersburg, got rid of the Polish generals, and entered into open conflict with Bennigsen and the Grand Duke.

皇帝离开军队是为了不致束缚总司令的权力的统一，指望以后能采取一些更坚决的措施；但是军队中的领导地位更加紊乱，而且逐渐削弱。贝尼格森、大公和一大群高级侍从武官留在军队中监视总司令的行动，并给他加以鼓劲，而巴克莱却觉得在国王的这些耳目监视之下更不自由了，对于决定性的行动更加小心了，总是避免战斗。

In Smolensk, in spite of Bagration's wishes to the contrary, the armies were at last united.

巴克莱主张谨慎行事。皇太子暗示这是背叛行为，并要求进行一场大会战。柳博米尔斯基、布拉尼茨基和弗洛茨基之流的人物，吵得之凶，使得巴克莱借口给皇上呈送文件，差遣波兰高级侍从武官到彼得堡去，然后对贝尼格森和大公进行一场公开的斗争。

Bagration drove up in his carriage to the house occupied by Barclay. Barclay put on his official scarf, and came out to greet and to present his report to his senior officer, Bagration. Bagration, to rival his magnanimity, acknowledged Barclay as his superior officer, in spite of his own seniority; but he was less in accord with him than ever. At the Tsar's command, he sent reports personally to him, and wrote to Araktcheev: “My sovereign's will is law, but I can do nothing acting with the minister” (so he called Barclay). “For God's sake, send me somewhere else, if only in command of a regiment, for here I can do nothing. The head-quarters are crammed full of Germans, there's no living here for a Russian, and no making head or tail of anything. I supposed I was serving my sovereign and my country, but in practice it comes to serving Barclay. I must own I do not care to.”

不管巴格拉季翁怎么也不愿意，最后军队还是在斯摩棱斯克会师了。

The swarm of Bronnitskys, Wintzengerodes, and others like them, embittered the feud between the commanders still further, and there was less unity than ever. Preparations were made to attack the French before Smolensk. A general was sent to review the position. This general, detesting Barclay, visits a friend of his own, a commander of a corps, and after spending the day with him, returns and condemns on every point the proposed field of battle without having seen it.

巴格拉季翁乘车前往巴克莱的官邸。巴克莱佩上绶带出来迎接，并向官阶较高的巴格拉季翁报告。巴格拉季翁极力做到宽宏大量，尽管官阶较高，仍听命于巴克莱的领导；但是当了部下，却和他更不协调了。巴格拉季翁遵照皇上的命令，亲自向他呈报。他在给阿拉克切耶夫的信中写道：“虽然这是我皇上的旨意，但我无论如何也无法与大臣（巴克莱）相处下去。看在上帝的情面上，请您随便把我派到哪儿去吧，即使是指挥一个团也好，但我不能在这里；因为整个大本营全是德国人，所以一个俄国人不能在这里，呆下去也没有一点意思。我原以为，我真正地在为皇上和祖国服务，但结果证明，我却是在为巴克莱服务。说真的，我是不情愿的。”一群布拉尼茨基、温岑格罗德之流的人物更加恶化了两位司令官之间的关系，结果是更加不统一了。他们准备在斯摩棱斯克前面向法军进攻，派遣了一名将官去视察阵地。但是他憎恨巴克莱，却到一个朋友——军团长那儿去呆了一天，然后才回到巴克莱那儿，从各方面挑剔这个他并未见到过的未来的战场。

While disputes and intrigues were going on as to the suitable spot for a battle, and while we were looking for the French and mistaking their line of advance, the French fell upon Nevyerovsky's division, and advanced upon the walls of Smolensk itself.

正当对未来战场的问题进行争吵和策划阴谋时，正当我们弄错了法军所在地而寻找法军时，法军已突破涅韦罗夫斯基的师团、并且兵临斯摩棱斯克城下。

We were surprised into having to fight at Smolensk to save our communications. A battle was fought. Thousands were slain on both sides.

为了挽救我们的交通线，必须在斯摩棱斯克打一场出乎意外的恶仗。仗是打了，双方都阵亡数千人。

Smolensk was abandoned against the will of the Tsar and the whole people. But Smolensk was burnt by its own inhabitants, who had been deceived by their governor. And those ruined inhabitants, after setting an example to the rest of Russia, full of their losses, and burning with hatred of the enemy, moved on to Moscow. Napoleon advances; we retreat; and so the very result is attained that is destined to overthrow Napoleon.

斯摩棱斯克失守了。这是违反了皇帝和全民的意志。但是斯摩棱斯克是居民受了省长的欺骗而自己毁掉的，倾家荡产的居民给其他的俄国人做了榜样，他们老想着自家的损失，从而心中燃起对敌人的怒火，向莫斯科逃去。拿破仑继续前进，我们则向后退，于是正好达到了必然战胜拿破仑的目的。